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ABSTRACT

One of the most pressing problems of current constitutional law in the
aftermath of September 11 is how to balance constitutional rights and
national security interests. No one however seems to pause and ask should
we balance individual rights and national security interests and if so when.
One of the reasons for this is the widespread acceptance of what I shall term
in this Article, the balancing consciousness: the view that every problem
can and should be solved through balancing conflicting considerations.
This Article demonstrates that the balancing consciousness is
misleading. Not every problem can and should be solved through balancing
conflicting considerations. Instead of the balancing consciousness, this
Article argues for a dual model, which envisions two logical forms of
decision-making—balancing and non-balancing. This model has farreaching implication for constitutional adjudication.
The dual model is based on a distinction between two levels, or orders,
of

considerations:

first-order

considerations,

and

second-order

considerations. The Article argues that constitutional rights can be divided
between these two types of considerations, and that balancing between a
constitutional right and a governmental interest is appropriate only when the
constitutional right is of the first order, not when it is of the second order.
Interestingly this insight, concerning the limited scope of balancing, was
once acknowledged in constitutional jurisprudence, but has since been
abandoned. This Article is therefore also a call for reinstalling the original
scope of balancing as it was once installed in American constitutional law.
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We cannot know for certain the sort of issues with which the Court will
grapple in the third century of its existence. But there is no reason to doubt
that it will continue as a vital and uniquely American institutional participant
in the everlasting search of civilized society for the proper balancing between
liberty and authority, between the state and the individual.
—William H. Rehnquist,

The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is1
[There is a] nearly universal elite legal academic view that we could indeed
resolve all situations where there is choice of norm by balancing conflicting
considerations of one kind or another.

—Duncan Kennedy
From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy2

1

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 319 (1987).

2

Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s

“Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94-95 (2000).
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most pressing problems of current constitutional law in the
aftermath of September 11 is how to balance constitutional rights and national
security interests.3 No one however seems to pause and ask should we balance
individual rights and national security interests and if so when. One of the reasons
for this is the widespread acceptance of what I shall term in this Article, the
balancing consciousness: the view that every problem can and should be solved
through balancing conflicting considerations. This view is shared by legal as well
as non-legal thinkers and is supported by two appealing arguments. The first
argument holds that every practical problem can be reduced, in principle, to the
relative assessment of conflicting considerations for and against a course of action
(e.g., the individual rights consideration and the national security interest
consideration). The second argument holds that the only alternative to balancing
is the creation of absolute or unbalanceable considerations. Since absolute
considerations are untenable according to this argument (e.g. individual rights can
never be absolute) it follows that balancing must apply to every decision.4
Despite the appeal of these two arguments, this Article demonstrates that the
view that every decision can and should be solved through balancing is
misleading. It shows that not every decision is reducible to a process of balancing
conflicting considerations, and that, while the creation of absolute considerations
is untenable, it is not the only alternative to balancing. Instead of the balancing
consciousness, which envisions balancing as the only logical form of decisionmaking this Article argues for a dual model that envisions two logical forms of
decision-making—balancing and non-balancing.
3

See, e.g., Searching for Balance: National Security's Threat to Civil Liberties, Stanford Law

School Panel held on January 2002; Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs.
Civil Liberties, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 175 (2003); Meaghan E. Ferrell, Balancing the First
Amendment and National Security: Can Immigration Hearings be Closed to Protect the Nation’s
Interest? 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 981 (2003); Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy
and Security in an Age of Terror, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 607 (2004).
4

See infra Part I (reviewing several manifestations of these two arguments).
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The dual model is a synthesis of two theoretical paradigms, from two
different fields—philosophy and law. The first paradigm, conceived by Oxford
philosopher, Joseph Raz, establishes the main contours of the dual model and
provides its principle terminology. The second paradigm, originated by Stanford
law professor, Mark Kelman, enriches the understanding of the dual model and
broadens it. The outcome is a new theoretical model, which I call the dual model.
The dual model refutes the balancing consciousness, but does not refute balancing
altogether. The main point of the dual model is the recognition that balancing is a
special kind of decision-making, applicable only when certain conditions are
present. Balancing is retained as a viable tool, but only at the price of limiting its
scope.
What are the conditions for balancing, and what are the two logical modes
that the dual model identifies? The two logical forms of decision-making conform
to two logical forms of conflicts. A balancing decision applies only to conflicts
between two valid or legitimate considerations of the same level (in Raz’s
terminology, first-order considerations). It does not apply to conflicts between a
consideration of a higher level (in Raz’s terms a second-order or exclusionary
consideration) and a consideration of a lower level (first-order). When a higherlevel consideration conflicts with a lower-level consideration, the decision is
made by excluding the lower-level consideration completely from the balance,
rather than by balancing.
When applied to the constitutional context, the dual model provides a tool for
determining the applicability of balancing. The question in each constitutional
case should be: what kind of conflict does the case present? Are both claims in the
conflict—the constitutional rights claim and the governmental interest claim—
first-order claims? Or, does one of the claims (the constitutional rights claim,
presumably) function as a second-order claim, thereby totally excluding the
governmental interest claim?
Reviewing several areas of constitutional law, this Article argues that the
answer to this question is that constitutional cases present both types of conflicts.
That is, some constitutional cases involve conflicts between two first-order
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considerations, and others include conflicts between a second-order consideration
and a first-order consideration. More specifically, some constitutional cases
involve constitutional rights claims that are only first-order claims (actually
constitutional interests claims), and others involve constitutional rights claims
that are ‘strong’ second-order claims (real rights claims)—the nature of the
conflict between the constitutional claim and the governmental interests changes
accordingly.
The application of the dual model to constitutional law therefore reveals two
distinct types of rights claims within constitutional law. The balancing
consciousness confounds the two. Since the balancing consciousness holds that
every conflict should be resolved through balancing, and that every right is
balanceable, it fails to distinguish between first-order and second-order rights
claims, and causes several distortions and analytical mistakes that haunt current
constitutional law.
Interestingly, this analytical confusion was not always part of constitutional
jurisprudence. A historical review shows that balancing was once properly
assigned only to first-order conflicts, and that the current confusion within
constitutional law was created at a certain point in time in American legal history
and as a result of a certain events. This Article is therefore also a call for
reinstalling the original meaning of balancing as it was originally developed in
American constitutional law.
The article can be divided into two main sections. The first section, consisting
of Parts I-III, refutes the balancing consciousness both generally and in
constitutional law, and replaces it by the dual model. Part I presents the balancing
consciousness, describes its two supporting arguments, and demonstrates some of
the reasons for its widespread acceptance. Part II presents the dual model, starting
from Raz’s model and complementing it with Kelman’s model. The combination
of the two models creates a new model, the dual model, which refutes the
balancing consciousness on both its supporting arguments. A possible objection to
the model is reviewed as well as its main implications. Part III then moves on to
apply the dual model to constitutional law. Starting with the right to free speech,
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constitutional cases involving free speech are divided into cases involving free
speech as a first-order interest and cases involving free speech as a second-order
right. Part III then looks at two other constitutional areas, dormant commerce
clause and equal protection, and shows that they can also be divided in the same
way.
The second section of the article, consisting of Parts IV and V, employs the
dual model to criticize central aspects of constitutional law in historical
perspective. Part IV reviews the historical development of balancing in American
constitutional law.

It shows that balancing first appeared in American

constitutional law when the progressives used it to criticize the notorious
Lochner5 Court. This Part argues that such a use of balancing, which I term early
balancing, was consistent with the dual model and indeed associated balancing
with the idea that some rights were only first-order interests. Early balancing also
associated balancing, surprisingly, with judicial restraint. Only later, around the
late 1930s, did balancing first appear in its modern form, in which it was
associated with the rhetoric of rights rather than interests and with judicial
activism rather than judicial restraint. This later form of the use of balancing,
which I term modern balancing, is consistent with the balancing consciousness
rather than with the dual model. It represents an unfortunate combination of rights
rhetoric and balancing, and distorts the nature of constitutional conflicts by
creating two major problems that still haunt constitutional law today.
Part V combines the historical review with the analytical discussion of the
dual model to form a criticism of two major problems in current constitutional
law. Using case studies from the same constitutional areas that were discussed in
Part III (freedom of speech, the dormant commerce clause, and equal protection)
this Part demonstrates that in each of these areas there are examples of the firstorder manifestation of the right being confused with the second-order
manifestation of the right (the first-to-second order mix-up) and examples of the
second-order manifestation of the right being confused with the first-order

5

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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manifestation of the right (the second-to-first order mix-up). That is, on the one
hand we have cases in which a right-oriented balancing, distorts the same-level
nature of a first-order conflict by suggesting that the constitutional rights
consideration is somehow different in nature and elevated above the governmental
consideration. On the other hand, we have a balancing-oriented attitude towards
real rights that distorts the non-balanceable, second-order nature of some rights
by suggesting that they are merely interests that must be balanced with the
governmental interests that conflict with them. Modern Balancing and the
balancing consciousness therefore create distortions of two opposite kinds: at
times they unnecessarily elevate constitutional rights, and at other times they
unnecessarily lower them, depending on the case and the type of right.
This Article offers a theory of balancing, portraying both the limits of
balancing and its legitimate scope. In this it differs from most other critical essays
on balancing, which tend to concentrate only on balancing’s problems and
deficiencies.6 It also attempts a novel distinction between two historical periods of
balancing, highlighting the fact that current balancing is different than its early
predecessor.7 Lastly, while partially motivated by issues concerning balancing
that have arisen in the aftermath of September 11, this Article does not address
those issues directly. Rather the reader is hopefully left with better analytical
6

See, e.g., Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424 (1962)

(criticizing balancing in First Amendment law during the McCarthy era); Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1987) (criticizing balancing in
constitutional law generally); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary
Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 707, 724 (1994) (rejecting balancing as the
leading model for constitutional interpretation); Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation
in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV 779, 801-4 (1994) (arguing against balancing different kinds of valuations
in the law); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001) (rejecting
balancing in First Amendment interpretation).
7

While there are several accounts of the history of balancing and of its origins (See, e.g.,

MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 18-19 (1992); Aleinikoff, id. at 952-63,) no one, to the best of my knowledge, has ever
argued that there are two different periods of balancing and that early balancing is different than
modern balancing.
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tools, and some historical perspective, to make up her own mind concerning the
current balancing problems of the day.
I. THE BALANCING CONSCIOUSNESS
Balancing is one of the oldest and most familiar metaphors in Western
culture.8 The physical manifestation of the metaphor is the act of balancing the
two sides of the scale.9 The mental aspect of the metaphor is a decision-making
method that requires contemplation of the relative importance or weight of two or
more considerations in favor of or against a course of action.10
8

See, e.g., HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASON ABOUT FINAL ENDS, p. 166, n. 2 (1997)

(“the metaphorical use of the terms ‘weighing’ and ‘balancing’ is well entrenched in Western
culture—embodied, as it is, in the figure of blind Justice.”) The earliest text to use the metaphor is
also one of the earliest human texts ever. It is the Acadian epos, The Epic of Gilgamesh, which dates
back to the third millennium B.C. The figure of Gilgamesh is introduced as: “He who… weighed
[the apparent and the hidden] in the scales of wisdom”. THE EPIC

OF

GILGAMESH, 27 (Tel Aviv,

1992, in Hebrew); See also the following overview of the use of the scales metaphor in ancient times
in Dennis E. Curtis and Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L. J. 1727, 1741, n. 32 (1987):
The scales seem to have been used as a symbol of a decision-making device since earliest
times. In the Egyptian ‘Book of the Dead’ (ca. 1400 B.C.), the soul of a dead person is
shown being weighed in a balance. One pan holds a heart-shaped vase symbolizing all of the
actions of the dead person; the other pan contains a feather, symbolizing Right and Truth.
The Old Testament refers to scales: ‘Let me be weighed in an even balance, that God may
know mine integrity.’ Job 31:6. Weighing as a symbol of Divine Judgment is also found in
the Koran... In the Iliad, the gods weigh to foretell the results of human events: ‘Then Jove
his golden scales weighed up, and took the last accounts of Fate for Hector....’ HOMER, THE
ILIAD, ch. xxii, (R. Fitzgerald trans. 1974). In early Christian representations, the ‘weighing
of the soul’ occurs in numerous Last Judgment scenes, often with Saint Michael holding the
scales.
9

See Curtis and Resnik Id.

10

See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS

AND

NORMS 35 (2nd ed., 1999) (defining

balancing in practical reason as “[resolving] conflicts [among different reasons for action] by the
relative weight or strength of the conflicting reasons which determines which of them override the
other.”) The metaphor can allude to a broader scope of mental activity than decision-making.
Balancing can be an operation that concerns any kind of deliberation, whether of deciding what to
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A more detailed description of the decision-making method implied by
balancing involves three stages. In the first stage, all the various considerations
involved in the decision are identified. In the second stage, each is assigned a
value or a weight according to its respective importance.11 Finally, all
considerations are put on the scale and weighed.12
Thus described, balancing appears to have become the predominant way to
solve both legal problems and moral problems generally.13 As the quote in the

do (practical reasoning), or forming a belief or opinion (theoretical reasoning.) Indeed one of the
meanings of the verb to “balance” is simply to “deliberate” (THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY vol.
I, 894 (sec. ed. 1989)). However, for reasons of simplicity, this Article will concentrate only on
deliberation concerning deciding what to do, which is a broad enough category as it is.
11

Describing constitutional balancing according to the first two stages, Alexander Aleinikoff

writes: “[b]y a ‘balancing opinion’ I mean a judicial opinion that analyzes a constitutional question
by identifying interests implicated by the case and… assigning values to the identified interests.”
Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 945.
12

The third stage of balancing is sometimes omitted from the description since it is

superfluous. Once the weights are assigned the outcome is already determined, and a further stage is
unnecessary. A famous example of describing balancing according to all three stages, is Benjamin
Franklin’s letter to a perplexed friend:
My way [of making difficult decisions] is, to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into two
columns; writing over the one pro and over the other con; then, during three or four days’
consideration, I put down, under the different heads, short hints of the different motives,
that at different times occur to me, for or against the measure. When I have thus got them
altogether in one view, I endeavor to estimate their respective weights… and thus
proceeding, I find where the balance lies.
Benjamin Franklin in a letter to Joseph Priestley (quoted in ALEXANDER BAIN, THE EMOTIONS AND
THE

WILL, 424-5 (1865)) (emphases in original). The fascinating topic of the metaphor of balancing

and its difficulties is not explored in this Article. For some philosophical accounts of this topic see
ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 280 (1958); John Plamenatz, Interests, 2 POLITICAL STUDIES 1, 5-6
(1958); Elijah Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in RUTH CHANG (ED.),
INCOMMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 151, 159 (1997).
13

The prevalence of balancing in solving moral problems can be established only indirectly,

through comments on prevailing moral conceptions. See, e.g., infra note 15. The prevalence of
balancing in the law can be established also more directly. Professor Kahn, for example, found out
that “the word ‘balance’ or ‘balancing’ does appear in 214 of the 473 cases decided in the last three
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beginning of this Article conveys, the view that all conflicts can, and should, be
resolved by balancing conflicting considerations—the balancing consciousness—
has become “a nearly universal elite legal academic view.”14 It is further said to
“reflect the general consciousness both among laymen and jurists.”15 What
accounts for this phenomenon? There are two persuasive arguments, each
supported by ideological underpinnings, that account for the balancing
consciousness’ prevalence both within the law and outside the law.
The first argument for the balancing consciousness is positive and I refer to it
as the reducibility argument. It maintains that balancing is fundamental to every
instance of decision-making. The second is negative, and I refer to it as the antiabsolutist argument. It maintains that balancing is unavoidable in every instance
of decision-making. The reducibility argument holds that every decision can be
reduced, in principle, to the assessment of the relative strength of the competing
considerations involved in the decision.16 The considerations that conflict may
vary in their weight or type from one case to the other,17 but the crucial point is
years [preceding 1987].” Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: the
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L. J. 1, 3 note 14 (1987). Aleinikoff notes that “[e]very
sitting Justice on the Supreme Court has relied on balancing [and] as a result, balancing now
dominates major areas of constitutional law.” Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 964-65.
14

Kennedy,supra note 2.

15

ROSS, supra note 12, at 279 -80. It is worth quoting the passage in full: “A widely held view,

which undoubtedly even better than Kant’s formalism reflects the general consciousness both
among laymen and jurists, declares that justice means the equal balancing of all the interests
affected by a certain decision.”
16

See, e.g., the following claim:

When choosing a legal norm to cover a case, rational decision-making selects from the
continuum of normative possibilities the one that best accommodates (balances…) the
conflicting considerations as they play out more or less strongly in the fact situation of
which the case is an instance… [A]ny norm can be looked at as the product of this kind of
analysis, and assessed as such.
Kennedy, supra note 2, at 105 (describing modern legal thinking) (emphasis added).
17

Kennedy, for example, divides the possible kinds of considerations that may conflict in a

legal case into ‘formal,’ ‘substantive’ and ‘institutional’ considerations. Kennedy, supra note 2, at
95.
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that no matter what the considerations are, any decision can ultimately be
described as being based on a balance between at least two conflicting
considerations. Justice Felix Frankfurter, for example, famously wrote: “the core
of the difficulty is that there is hardly a question of any real difficulty before the
court that does not entail more than one so-called principle.”

18

And Duncan

Kennedy writes that “[i]t never makes sense, when justifying a rule, to say this it
is good because it promotes [one value or interest]. To make sense it must add: at
an acceptable cost to [the opposite values or interest.]”19
The anti-absolutist argument for the balancing consciousness addresses the
same insight from a negative perspective. Since every decision involves more
than one consideration, no single consideration can, or should be given absolute
importance. Balancing is therefore unavoidable since it stands in contrast to the
creation of absolute considerations. In the realm of constitutional rights, this
argument takes on the familiar form of rejecting the idea that rights can ever be
absolute: “Balancing is problematic…Yet, the alternative to balancing seems
much worse…[The alternative is] to create an absolute right…Few rights can or
should be regarded as absolute.”20
Both arguments for the balancing consciousness are founded on major
schools of thought. The reducibility argument relies foremost on utilitarianism.
According to utilitarianism one should always decide on a course of action that
results in maximum utility. This ideology therefore supports the view that at the
core of every moral (and rational) decision lies a process of balancing the pros
and cons of a given course of action.21 One of the modern offspring of

18

FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 43 (1956).

19

Kennedy,supra note 2, at 113 (describing modern legal thinking).

20

Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Scholarship in the 1990s, 45 HASTINGS. L. J. 1105,

1116-17 (1994) (emphasis added).
21

See, e.g., the following utilitarian justification for balancing: “The goal of morality [is] to

lessen the overall evil or harm in the world. [Therefore one must always] balance harms and benefits
[and ask]: Is the harm involved in acting against the rule greater than the benefit to be attained by
doing so?” BERNARD GERT, CHARES CULVER,

AND

K. DANNER CLOUSER, BIOETHICS: A RETURN TO
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utilitarianism, economic analysis in the humanities and in the law, also supports
the idea that every decision is reducible to balancing. Economic analysis teaches
us to look at the costs of any course of action and to regard any decision as a
trade-off between opposing considerations. The idea of putting a price tag on each
course of action implies that every decision is reducible to cost benefit
balancing.22
The anti-absolutist argument for the balancing consciousness relies on
philosophical

anti-absolutist

movements,

such

as

pragmatism

and

instrumentalism, which reject the idea of absolutes in morals, in practical
reasoning and in law.23 These movements espouse the view that human endeavor
should concentrate on attaining pragmatic ends, not on the false search for
absolute and immutable first principles or values. Balancing the interests affected
by our decisions reflects such a pragmatic approach, while refusing to balance is
embracing the false and unattainable ideal of absolute certainties. Justice
Frankfurter is again the best legal representative of this ideology as it applies to
balancing:
[Absolute] rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions. [It is better to
decide by] candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the
confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the
non-Euclidean problems to be solved. 24

The anti-absolutist argument is also backed by economic analysis as a mirror
argument to its support for the reducibility argument. According to this line of
FUNDAMENTALS (1997), pp. 62, 86 and 254, cited in Henry Richardson, Specifying, Balancing, and
Interpreting Bioethical Principles, 25 J. MED. & PHIL. 285, 294-95 (2000).
22

For a critical review of cost benefit balancing see Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of Cost

Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 971 (2000); For a general review of balancing and its relation to
Law and Economics, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of
(A Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997).
23

For a review of the connection between balancing and pragmatism both in morals and in the

law see Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 956-63; see also generally ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982).
24

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951).
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argument, the idea of non-balanceable absolutes is a false attempt to disregard the
simple truth that every choice has a price. No matter how important a right or a
value may be, it cannot be immune to balancing or to a possible trade-off with
other values, since it necessarily has a price, and one cannot devote all one’s
resources to one value only.25
Finally, the ideology of pluralism and multiculturalism adds weight to the
anti- absolutist argument for balancing. A pluralistic society is committed to the
idea that different and conflicting world-views can co-exist within it.26 Balancing
can ensure that no one value gets absolute weight, and no other value gets totally
rejected. Refusing to balance is therefore tantamount to intolerance and value
monopoly.27

25

See, e.g., the following argument for balancing the value of human life:

We cannot avoid trade-offs between the protection of human life and other goods such as
economic growth, for we cannot reasonably devote unlimited resources to human life… by
indefinitely expanding medical expenditures, police forces, and the like.
Elizabeth Anderson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in RUTH CHANG (ED.),
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,

AND

PRACTICAL REASON 90, 105 (1997) (describing

prevailing economic analyses of values and goods).
26

See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger in Lynch v. Donnelly:

In our modern, complex society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on
and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the
Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court.
465 U.S. 668, at 678 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
27

See, e.g., the following description of balancing’s qualities:

[Balancing] aims to give voice to each interest by setting forth a rule that accommodates
all of them. Ideally, that rule allows each interest its maximum realization consistent with
recognition of and respect for other competing interests. [Balancing’s] end is recognition
and reconciliation, not exclusion.
Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: the Jurisprudence of Justice
Powell, 97 YALE L. J. 1,9 (1987) (describing the philosophy behind Justice Powell’s balancing).
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II. THE DUAL MODEL THESIS
The two arguments mentioned in Part I—the reducibility argument and the
anti- absolutist argument, —coupled with their ideological underpinnings, create a
powerful case for the balancing consciousness—the view that balancing is
fundamental to all decision-making and unavoidable in all cases of decisionmaking. This Part attempts to show that the balancing consciousness is misguided
by presenting a new model for balancing—the dual model. The dual model is a
synthesis of the works of two scholars: Joseph Raz and Mark Kelman.
A. Joseph Raz—Balancing and Levels of Reasons
Joseph Raz, in an important essay about practical reasoning,28 describes a
view which is very similar to the balancing consciousness. It is the view that “all
practical conflicts of reasons are resolved by the relative weight or strength of the
conflicting reasons which determines which of them overrides the other.”29 Raz
terms this view in his essay, P1.30
What Raz then notices is that, contrary to the tenets of the balancing
consciousness, or P1, not all kinds of conflicts are resolved through balancing.
Raz presents three examples of conflicts in which the balancing norm does not
apply.
The first example is the case of Ann. Ann returns home after a strenuous day
at work and receives a phone call from a friend. Her friend recommends a certain
investment, but says that Ann must decide that evening or the offer will expire.
Although the proposed investment appears very promising, it is also very
complicated, and the decision requires several hours of thorough investigation.
Ann replies to her friend that she is too tired to make a rational decision on the
merits of the case. Raz explains her position:
28

RAZ, supra note 10.

29

Id. at 35.

30

Raz formalizes this view as follows: “P1: It is always the case that one ought, all things

considered, to do whatever one ought to do on the balance of reasons.” Id. at 36.
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She is rejecting the offer not because she thinks the reasons against it override
those in its favour [P1]… but because she has a reason [her fatigue] not to act on
the merits of the case. This, she concedes is a kind of reason not recognized in P1,
but that only shows that P1 is not valid.

31

The second example is the case of Jeremy. Jeremy serves in the army and is
ordered by his commander to confiscate a civilian van for military use. Jeremy’s
friend tries to convince him that confiscating the van would be wrong, because,
on balance, confiscating the van would bring more harm than benefit. Jeremy
rejects his friend’s attempts and explains:
[T]he order is a reason for doing what you were ordered regardless of the balance
of reasons… Orders are orders and should be obeyed even if… no harm will
come from disobeying them. That is what it means to be a subordinate. It means
that it is not for you to decide what is best. You may see that on the balance of
reasons one course of action is right and yet be justified in not following it.

32

The third and final example is the case of Colin. Colin has to decide whether
to send his son to an expensive and good school, or to a cheaper school of lesser
quality. If he sends his son to the more expensive school, he will not be able to
quit his job and write the novel he always wanted to write. In addition if he sends
his son to the more expensive school, some of his friends will do the same,
although they cannot afford to do so. However, Colin disregards both these
considerations because he promised his wife that “in all decisions affecting the
education of his son he will act only for his son’s interests and disregard all other
reasons.”33
Raz’s three examples show incidents of decision-making that do not follow
the balancing consciousness. Had balancing been behind these practical decisions
or conflicts they ought to have been decided by balancing all the relevant
considerations and acting according to those that outweighed the others. However,
Ann does not balance the considerations for and against the investment, because
31

Id. at 37.

32

Id. at 38.

33

Id. at 39.
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she is tired. Jeremy does not balance the considerations for and against obeying
the order, because he thinks that this would contradict the idea of being a
subordinate. And Colin does not balance some of the considerations for or against
sending his son to an expensive school, because he promised to take into account
only those considerations that pertain to his son’s interests.
Raz’s examples show the existence of special reasons and special conflicts
that are not included in the balancing consciousness model. Ann’s fatigue,
Jeremy’s position, and Colin’s promise are not reasons for or against a course of
action. Rather, they are reasons not to take into consideration some other reasons.
They are exclusionary reasons, or second-order reasons: reasons to exclude
some, or all, first-order reasons from the decision-making process. Such reasons
do not concern the decision directly, but do concern the (first-order) reasons for
the proposed decision. Ann’s fatigue is a reason to exclude all the considerations
for or against the investment. Jeremy’s position is a reason to exclude all
considerations for or against the confiscation (except for the order itself.) And
Colin’s promise is a reason to exclude all those considerations not relating to his
son’s interests.
The special thing about exclusionary reasons is that they are never simply
balanced with other, regular, or first-order reasons. It is true, according to Raz,
that when first-order reasons conflict, they are always balanced one against the
other according to their respective weight or strength (P1). However, when an
exclusionary reason and a first-order reason conflict, no balancing is pursued. Put
differently, while it is true for first-order reasons that “they are comparable with
regard to strength (i.e. that the relation stronger than or of equal strength [applies
to them,])”34 this is not true for second-order reasons that conflict with first-order
reasons. In such conflicts, Raz claims, “the strength of the exclusionary reason is
not put to the test. [Rather, the second-order reason] prevails by virtue of being a
reason of a higher order.” Raz therefore maintains: “there are two ways in which

34

Id. at 43 (emphasis in original).
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reasons can be defeated. They can be overridden by strictly conflicting reasons or
excluded by exclusionary reasons.”35
In conclusion, Raz’s three examples disprove the balancing consciousness,
P1, by claiming that the pattern of balancing, weight, and overriding does not
reflect all possible logical patterns of decisions. In particular, it does not reflect
the relationship between second-order/exclusionary reasons and first-order regular
reasons. Raz’s examples indicate at least three common types of exclusionary
reasons that eschew balancing: temporary incapacity to form judgment,
commands, and promises.36 To this list Raz added: norms,37 and rules.38 Others
have also added values and desires.39 Taken together these types of reasons form
an important part of the entire sphere of practical reasoning. “Despite the
indiscriminate application of the terminology of ‘weight,’ ‘strength,’ ‘overriding,’
‘on balance,’ etc.,” Raz concludes, “we do in fact use different modes of
reasoning to support different practical conclusions.” 40
Several clarifications to the above review of Raz’s theory are in order:
1. Raz’s theory is a descriptive or phenomenological theory, not a normative
theory. That is, Raz’s examples show that people do in fact regard some reasons
as exclusionary reasons and therefore eschew balancing, not that they are justified
in doing so. For example, Raz does not claim that Jeremy is right in viewing his
commander’s order as an exclusionary reason, and in refusing to balance the
reasons for or against the order. Raz only claims that Jeremy (who exhibits
common behavior) does in fact regard the command as an exclusionary reason
and does in fact refuse to balance reasons for or against the order.41

35

Id. at 40, 46 (emphasis added).

36

The latter types of reasons are termed by Raz, “authority-based reasons,” and the former,

“incapacity based reasons.” Id. at 47-8.
37

Id. at 73.

38

Id. at 142.

39

See infra note 67.

40

Id. at 35,36, 204.

41

Id. at 38.
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2. In forming a second-order reason, one can use general balancing (unless
there is another, higher-order reason that qualifies balancing at this level also).
Thus, for example, Jeremy’s commander can decide whether to give the order to
Jeremy by balancing costs and benefits (i.e. first-order reasons). For Jeremy,
however, such balancing is blocked, if he treats the command as a valid secondorder reason. In addition, two second-order reasons can conflict in a particular
case, and when they do, the conflict is resolved by balancing according to
respective weights.42
3. Having an exclusionary reason does not make decisions easy. First, as
mentioned above, a second-order reason may conflict with other second-order
reasons. In addition, according to Raz, the scope of a second-order reason can be
affected by “scope-affecting reasons.” For example, in the case of Jeremy, the
rank of the officer may function as a scope-affecting reason: “Jeremy may assign
a greater scope to the orders of an officer of a higher rank. There will be fewer
cases in which he would rely and act on his own judgment when it conflicts with
an instruction given by a high-ranking officer, [rather than a low-ranking
officer.]”43
4. The conflict between two first-order reasons is incidental, while the
conflict between a second-order and a first-order reason is logical. Two first-order
reasons may conflict in some cases, but in other cases they may not conflict. It all
depends on the particularities of the case. However, a second-order reason will
always conflict with the first-order reason it excludes. This is because the
exclusion of the first-order reason is part of what it means to be that particular
second-order reason. The first conflict is therefore incidental, while the second is
necessary and logical.44

42

Id. at 47.

43

Id. at 46-47.

44

Id. at 183.
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B. Mark Kelman—Balancing and ‘Costs’
We turn now to another essay that disproves the balancing consciousness.
This essay, unlike Raz’s, is couched within a specific legal context. Mark Kelman
examines anti-discrimination litigation, specifically Title VII litigation concerning
discrimination in the workplace, and The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
litigation, and notices two types of claims that are being brought under those
statutes.45 The first type of claim he terms simple discrimination and the second,
accommodation.46 A black job applicant that is not hired because the employer
hates blacks has a claim against simple discrimination.47 A disabled job applicant
that is not hired because employing him requires costly adjustments to the
workplace has a claim for accommodation.48
Current doctrine usually treats both these types of claims according to the
same balancing logic, in which the evils of discrimination are balanced with the
costs of curbing the discriminatory activity. However, like Raz, Kelman reaches
the conclusion that one logical type of decision is not enough, and that the two
types of claims call for two types of decision-making methods, only one of which
is balancing. Why he thinks so is very interesting. Kelman argues that simple
discrimination claims should not be balanced with other claims because accepting
45

Mark Kelman, Market discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833 (2001). Earlier

essays by Kelman apply a similar distinction. See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in
"General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1164-70 (1991); MARK KELMAN &
GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE, 195-208 (1997).
46

The term accommodation is based on its regular meaning in the legal literature. It is,

however, formalized by Kelman as the discussion bellow will show.
47

Kelman provides the following formal definition of the norm against simple discrimination:

[E]mpowered market actors (i.e., employers, sellers of goods and services classed as
‘public accommodations’) are duty-bound to treat those putative plaintiffs with whom they
deal (job applicants, employees, would-be buyers) no worse than they treat others who are
equivalent sources of money.
Id. at 835.
48

The formal definition of the accommodation claim is: “a claim to receive treatment from a

defendant that disregards some (though not all) differential input costs.” Id. at 836.
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them does not cost anything in terms of other legitimate claims. Accommodation
claims, on the other hand, do have costs and therefore have to be balanced with
other claims. This view seems odd and counterintuitive—how could anything be
costless? However, I believe it is correct, and furthermore that it represents a
reason for accepting Raz’s model in the area of anti-discrimination law: simple
discrimination claims are exclusionary claims, while accommodation claims are
only first-order claims.
The following will be an attempt to summarize Kelman’s analysis by
identifying five differences between simple discrimination claims and
accommodation claims. An understanding of these differences will demonstrate
that Kelman’s distinctions are similar to Raz’s. Furthermore, I will argue that the
combination of Raz and Kelman’s frameworks provides a new and improved
dual-model for balancing.
1. The first difference between the two types of claims is that an
accommodation claim has a limit—it must be reasonable—while a simple
discrimination does not have such a limit. The accommodation norm requires
only reasonable accommodation from employers in the workplace. For example,
paying for a special elevator for the disabled might be reasonable, but buying an
extremely costly machine to help a particular disabled worker might not. To every
accommodation claim, therefore, the employer may answer that such a claim is
unreasonable, and this answer would have to be evaluated according to the
particularities of the case. The simple discrimination norm, on the other hand, is
not limited in the same way. We do not require that employers not discriminate
against black applicants only when it is not reasonable to do so, or only when the
particularities of the case allows it. The norm against simple discrimination
carries with it a much more categorical ban on discrimination, which is not
subject to the test of reasonability.49

49

Id. at 834-5. For a qualification of this claim see infra notes 56,57and accompanying text.

This qualification applies also to the other four differences between simple discrimination and
accommodation reviewed below.
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2. Secondly, and obviously important for our purposes, an accommodation
claim involves balancing, while a simple discrimination claim does not. A
decision to accommodate a disabled person involves weighing the benefit from
such accommodation versus its costs. Consider a law firm that is asked to provide
an extremely expensive machine for a lawyer with a rare disability. Such a firm
may not have enough money left to provide accommodation to another disabled
lawyer employee, or to provide more leaves for employees with children, or to
engage in more pro bono work that could benefit third parties, or even any money
left at all, which would cause the employer to go bankrupt. The accommodation
claim of the disabled person with the rare disability has to be balanced with all of
these claims, and in this balancing analysis it might turn out that its cost is too
high and this would be a reason to deny it. In simple discrimination claims,
however, we do not typically engage in balancing. We do not weigh the value of a
black job applicant to be free from discrimination against the cost to the employer
in not being able to follow his racist inclinations. We also do not weigh the
societal value of having a society without discrimination versus the societal cost
in terms of the lost opportunities to discriminate. In simple discrimination cases
we do not balance.50
3. Why do we not balance in simple discrimination cases? We do not balance
because we regard the racist inclinations of the employer in such cases as
illegitimate or harmful motivations that are objects of abolition, while we do not
so regard the considerations of the employers in accommodation cases. This is the

50

Kelman writes:

The ‘simple discrimination’ norm establishes a strong entitlement, what rights theorists
would consider a side constraint on the conduct of those who would violate the norm….
Claims of right by one plaintiff should not be balanced against competing claims by other
plaintiffs seeking similar treatment…[or against] claims by defendants that it would be
unduly costly to meet the plaintiff’s claims … [or against] claims by non-participants in
the suit that they are more worthy recipients of the ‘resources’ the defendant is expected to
‘expend’.
Id. at 835.
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third difference between simple discrimination and accommodation claims—the
difference in terms of the legitimacy of the claims.
The interest of the employer in an accommodation case is to save money by
not spending it on accommodating the disabled employee. It is not illegitimate per
se and we would not want the employer to refrain from considering it in any
future cases. The problem may lie not in its illegitimacy, but in the fact that it is
given too much weight in the case, or, to put it differently, that it should be
overridden by another more important consideration—the accommodation
consideration. Simple discrimination cases, however, present a different problem.
Since the racist employer’s interest in following his racist ideology is illegitimate
per se, there are no cases in which we would approve of him following them, and
we would like them abolished altogether. The problem in simple discrimination
cases does not lie in the fact that a consideration is given too much weight, or that
it is overridden by another consideration, but in the fact that it is illegitimate.51
4. The fourth difference between Kelman’s two types of anti-discrimination
claims is that simple discrimination claims do not have costs, while
accommodation claims do. How so? Satisfying an accommodation claim has a
cost in terms of real social resources. The employer in the above example has to
spend money on buying the special machine, and this in turn means that he would
not be able to spend it on something else. Therefore, not all accommodation
claims can be met, since they would necessarily conflict: paying for the special
machine, means not paying for other machines.52 Simple discrimination claims,
however, have no social cost in terms of real social resources. There is no cost
involved in abolishing simple discrimination of the kind of not hiring a lawyer
51

Kelman writes:

The non-accommodation defendant… attempts to retain (or save) real social resources…
[that] are public and objective, and the desire to expend them completely socially
legitimate.…On the other hand, the simple discriminator gains utility from acting on tastes
that are ordinarily imperfectly fungible, private/subjective, and arguably illegitimate.
Id. at 854.
52

“[T]hose seeking accommodation are making claims on real social resources that compete

with all other social resource claimants; all such claims cannot be met.” Id. at 837.

THE DUAL MODEL OF BALANCING

23

because she is black (unless one considers depriving people of opportunities to
apply a racist ideology to be a cost.53) Therefore, all claims of simple
discrimination can be met and they would not conflict with each other: We can
satisfy the claims against simple discrimination of Jews and against simple
discrimination of blacks and against simple discrimination of women, and those
claims would not conflict.54
5. Finally, the fifth difference, which is an outgrowth of the fourth difference,
concerns the economic attributes of the two types of claims. Since
accommodation claims have costs, they can be described as distributive claims, or
claims for a share in a common budget—be it the employer’s budget, or the
state’s budget if the cost is born by the state. They can also be described as policy
arguments for the allocation of money for an important goal, namely, integrating
disabled people into society, or, improving their quality of life. Such claims
compete in a zero-sum game with other valid claims over limited resources.
However, simple discrimination claims are not distributive claims and they do not
compete with other claims in a zero-sum game. They are not policy arguments for
spending money. They are what are typically termed rights claims.55
As with Raz’s scheme, some clarifications are in order. I will consider two
such clarifications. First, Kelman does not argue that the norm against simple
discrimination is absolute, in the sense that no consideration could ever be
balanced with it. His claim is only that, once the decision has been made that
discrimination is not allowed, a claim against simple discrimination does not
regularly have to stand to the balance.56 Secondly, Kelman needs to address the
53

Such cost would be a “private” or “subjective” cost, but not a “public” cost, since racist

ideology is publicly perceived as illegitimate. See id., passage quoted in note 51, supra.
54

See id. at 836.

55

“The accommodation [claim is a] distributive claim … rather than a right.” Id. at 837.

56

This clarification is actually two clarifications. First, that balancing is allowed in the stage of

formulating the right against simple discrimination. (Kelamn writes:
The ‘right’ [against simple discrimination] is not, in my view, ‘absolute’ in its formation or
initial articulation. That is to say, we cannot ascertain whether or not a party ought to have
the right to be free from simple discrimination without engaging in conventional policy
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issue of customers’ preferences, which seems to show that avoiding simple
discrimination does have a cost after all (e.g., if the employer would hire the black
person, she would loose customers.) Kelman addresses this issue through the idea
of vicarious simple discrimination: the customers are the ones engaged in simple
discrimination. The employer is just the middleman between the customers and
the employee.57

balancing, weighing the interests of potential defendants against those of rights claimants.
But once that policy balancing is done, we establish a scheme of rights that does not
demand case-by- case balancing.
Id. at 835-6. Compare with Raz’s clarification, according to which balancing is possible at the level
of forming the second-order reason. Supra note 42 and accompanying text,) and secondly, that
balancing a claim against simple discrimination is allowed under extreme circumstances, but not on
a regular basis. (Kelamn writes:
In the anti-discrimination context, for instance, one supposes that an employer might
temporarily segregate workers in an otherwise impermissible fashion to avert severe racial
violence, if no less rights-violative alternative were available… What differentiates this
cost-benefit calculation from a typical cost-benefit calculation is simply that the defendant
must prove that the costs of observing the conventional right in these contexts far outweigh
the benefits before he is immunized from the duty to observe the right. It is also possible
to argue that parties can invoke justification defenses only when trying to prevent harms
that are in some fashion incommensurate with the benefits we expect from following
ordinary practices… [I]n either case, claims of simple discrimination will not be routinely
subject to balancing tests.
Id. at 836, note 7).
57

Kelman wirtes:

I have long claimed that customer preference cases are… simple discrimination cases. The
employer, in essence, acts as an agent of customers. (The ‘real’ employer of a shoe
salesman is the shoe store customer; the shoe store manager simply intermediates between
customers and salesman.)

An employer would, in essence, manifest the customers’

impermissible market-irrationality if she were able to say that she refused to hire those that
customers would not deal with, not because of her own market- irrationality, but because
profits would decline if she hired an unpopular salesperson.
Id. at 848.
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C. The Dual Model of Balancing—Raz and Kelman Combined
I propose that the five differences between simple discrimination claims and
accommodation claims according to Kelman’s analysis correlate with Raz’s two
orders of reasons. Recall that Raz defined a second-order/exclusionary
consideration as “any reason to… refrain from acting for a reason.”58 Kelman’s
analysis shows that a claim of simple discrimination, or the anti-discrimination
norm, functions just like an exclusionary consideration: it is a reason to exclude
other reasons—discriminatory reasons, such as the interest in racial separation—
from being acted upon in the workplace. Put differently, the anti-discrimination
norm can be seen as a second-order promise not to take into account certain firstorder considerations—i.e. discriminatory considerations—in making decisions in
the workplace.59 The accommodation claim, however, functions only as a firstorder consideration. It is not a second-order consideration of a higher level, which
makes some lower level reasons totally excluded. Rather, it is a regular reason
that adds to the total balance of reasons in the case. It is one more consideration to
be balanced with other valid considerations of the same level within the sphere of
the workplace, according to its weight under the circumstances.60
However, Kelman’s analysis does not merely follow Raz’s analysis. It also
provides new and rich insight into Raz’s model, so that the two frameworks
combined form an improved and powerful tool for analyzing balancing, which I
call the dual model. Raz contributes the distinction between the two levels of
reasons, while Kelman complements this description by enumerating the five
58

RAZ, supra note 10,at 39.

59

This promise would be a promise of the American society as a whole, instead of a promise of

single person, as in Raz’s example of Colin’s promise.
60

Another feature of the Razian analysis also applies to Kelman’s analysis. The claims of the

employer and of the employee conflict logically in simple discrimination (they would always
conflict since it is always the case that the wish for racial separation conflicts with the norm against
simple discrimination), while they only incidentally conflict in accommodation cases (it is not
always the case that the wish to save money conflicts with the accommodation norm. This will only
happen if the wish to save money results in not giving enough money for accommodation.)
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differences between simple discrimination and accommodation cases as well as
providing the vocabulary of costs, distribution and allocation of resources.
Kelman’s analysis reveals that first-order reasons are actually appeals for the
allocation of resources to an important goal. As appeals for resources, first-order
reasons always have costs, and therefore always have to compete, at least in
principle, with all other valid (first-order) claims for the same resources. Thus,
they should be properly considered to be budgetary claims—claims which are, by
nature, subject to reasonability and to balancing.

But, continues Kelman’s

analysis, not all claims are budgetary claims for resources. Some claims rely on
an earlier commitment to disregard other claims as illegitimate, or regard their
abolition as costless. These are second-order reasons. Kelman’s analysis,
therefore, reveals both that first-order reasons are budgetary claims that have a
cost, and also that second-order reasons are non-budgetary reasons, which are, by
definition, cost free.
To demonstrate the combination of the two analytical schemes, consider once
again Raz’s example of Colin61 analyzed in Kelman’s terms. All the first-order
considerations for and against sending Colin’s son to the expensive school had
costs. They all necessarily came one at the expense of the other in a zero sum
game and were in fact claims for resources. For example, sending Colin’s son to
an expensive school would come at the expense of writing Colin’s novel, because
they both cost money and Colin has a limited amount of money. Similarly,
Colin’s son’s interest in attending the expensive school can be described as a
claim for a share in Colin’s budget, or as a claim for the allocation of Colin’s
recourses, or as a claim that Colin accommodate his son’s needs.
However, Colin’s second-order reason—his promise to consider only his
son’s interests in making decisions regarding his son’s education—is not a claim
for resources. In fact it is not a claim at all, but a reason to exclude some other
claims, namely those claims that do not relate to his son’s interests, from being
considered, or from being regarded as valid claims or costs. The promise itself is

61

Supra note 33and accompanying text.
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therefore not reliant on limited resources, and accepting it does not cost anything.
Rather, once the promise is in place, denying those considerations that are
excluded by the promise is costless, since Colin has already decided that they
should be disregarded.62
The following table summarizes the dual model distinction between firstorder and second-order consideration, combining the schemes of Raz and
Kelman.
Table 1: First-Order and Second-Order Considerations—Raz and Kelman Combined

1

First-order considerations

Second-order/exclusionary considerations

Give reasons for or against a course of

Give reasons to exclude other reasons from being

action.

considered in making a decision for or against a
course of action

2

4

Constitute claims for the allocation of

Constitute claims to abolish illegitimate or invalid

societal resources.

considerations.

Subject to balancing with other claims

Not subject to balancing, not competing for

for resources, come at the expense of

resources, all claims can be met.

such other claims, compete with them
over limited resources, not all claims
can be met.
5

Distributive. Resemble claims for a

Not distributive. Resemble claims that a certain

share in a budget.

consideration should not be given any share in the
budget, because it is invalid.

6

Conflict incidentally with other first-

Conflict logically with the first-order reasons they

order reasons.

exclude.

Before moving on to assessing the implications of the dual model, I would
like to address a possible objection to the dual model. According to this objection,
even a second-order/exclusionary consideration will have to be balanced at some
point, if the costs of abiding by it are too high, or its consequences too extreme. If
the costs of abiding by a promise, or a rule, or even the anti-discrimination norm,
are too high, an exception to them will be found, and they will be balanced with

62

See also infra notes 63 and 64and accompanying text .
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the first-order consideration that they are supposed to exclude. This goes to show
that there is no real distinction between first-order and second-order
considerations.
There are three possible replies to this objection. For purposes of brevity I
only sketch these replies briefly, leaving their full elaboration to another
opportunity. The first reply is that second-order/exclusionary considerations
include within them also their exceptions. For example, the idea that a promise is
a second-order/exclusionary consideration does not require absolute obedience to
the promise. It requires only that those exceptions to the promise that are allowed
would be found in the practice of promising itself.63 The second reply is that,
although in some extreme circumstances we might allow the balancing of a
second-order/exclusionary consideration, under regular circumstances we would
not allow such balancing. Promises and norms, such as the norm against simple
discrimination, are second-order considerations since we do not regularly balance
them with other considerations.64 Finally, the third reply is that, while balancing a
63

John Rawls makes a similar argument in one of his early essays:

Is this [claiming that a promise should not be balanced] to say that in particular cases one
cannot deliberate whether or not to keep one’s promise? Of course not. But to do so is to
deliberate whether the various excuses, exceptions and defenses which are understood, and
which constitute an important part of the practice, apply to one’s own case. Various
defenses for not keeping one’s promise are allowed… there may be a defense that the
consequences of keeping one’s promise would have been extremely severe… But this sort
of defense, allowed by the practice, must not be confused with the general option to weigh
each particular case on utilitarian grounds.
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 3 (1955), reprinted in FREDERICK
A. OLAFSON (ED.), SOCIETY, LAW,

AND

MORALITY 420 (1961), at 428-29. Compare with the

following distinction between internal and external constitutional interpretation: “[T]he ‘exception’
may best be understood not as resulting from a balance but as resting upon a principle internal to the
constitutional provision… That is, where the justification for, or basis of, the right no longer applies,
the right should not be recognized. This ‘internal’ argument is quite distinct from… the ‘external’
evaluation of costs that balancing entails.” Aleinikoff, supra note 6 at 1000.
64

Consider the following example by Aleinikoff:

I promise to pick you up at the train station at noon. At 11:55 a.m., a friend breaks a leg
and needs to be taken to the hospital. If I take her, I won't get to the station until 12:30 p.m.

THE DUAL MODEL OF BALANCING

29

second-order/exclusionary consideration is possible, it would manifest a change
in the role of the agent engaged in balancing. The balancer’s role would change
from that of an agent operating under the second-order norm, to that of an agent
engaged in changing or forming the second-order norm. The distinction between
the two kinds of considerations remains valid.65 These three replies are
interrelated, however, for the purposes of this Article, any one of them should
suffice.66

Of course, I go to the hospital (even though I have no way of getting a message to you).
One could say that implicit in my promise to pick you up is the possibility that some
pressing need will command my attention at exactly the time the train arrives. But I won't
even go that far. I will assume that I agreed to get you come hell or high water and that I
have decided to break the promise because of the unforeseen circumstance—because a
broken leg ‘outweighs’ a half-hour wait at the train station. This emergency situation does
not suggest that I would have considered leaving you to watch the trains go by for any
reason. I would not have calculated costs and benefits if someone else asked me to lunch,
if there were a television show on at noon that I wanted to watch, or if I needed just thirty
more minutes to develop a coherent theory of equal protection law.
Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 1000 n. 317. See supra note 56(Kelman’s sec ond clarification) for
the same argument concerning balancing the norm against simple discrimination.
65

Compare with the following by Rawls:

[I]f one holds an office defined by a practice then questions regarding one’s actions in this
office are settled by reference to the rules which define the practice. If one seeks to
question these rules, then one’s office undergoes a fundamental change: one assumes the
office of one empowered to change and criticize the rules, or the office of a reformer.
Rawls, supra note 63at 433.
66

There is actually a forth reply to the objection to the dual model, which follows a Pragmatist

line of justification. According to this reply, the dual model is valid, because it ‘works’. That is, it
provides a helpful set of tools in analyzing practical problems, and gives us a richer picture of
practical problems than its balancing consciousness alternative. The test for this answer would be in
the success of the application of the dual model to practical legal problems, which would be the aim
of the rest of the Article.
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D. The Implications of the Dual Model
What are the implications of this new dual model for balancing? Why have I
taken the reader through all of Kelamn’s and Raz’s fine analytical distinctions? If
the analysis is correct, its implications for balancing, both in terms of rejecting the
balancing consciousness, and in terms of understanding the true nature of
balancing, are quite far-reaching.
The first implication of the dual model is the rejection of both of the
supporting arguments of the balancing consciousness. The reducibility argument
is repudiated since not every decision is reducible to balancing. Every decision is
reducible to balancing only if we were to assume a “flat” world, in which all
considerations are first-order considerations. However, as Raz and Kelman
demonstrate, many important considerations (rules, promises, and norms, such as
the norm against simple discrimination) function as considerations of a different
level. They are second-order considerations, and they should not be balanced with
first-order considerations.67
The anti-absolutist argument is also partially repudiated by the dual model.
This is an especially important point, since the anti-absolutist argument is an

67

To the list of second-order considerations that defy a “flat” view of practical reason, one can

also add values, and valuations (See Nussbaum, supra note 22; Sunstein , supra note 6; Richardson,
supra note 22; Anderson, supra note 25. (all criticizing

the law and economic movement by

stressing the idea that certain values and valuations are incommensurable and that there must be a
distinction between levels and types of values and valuations,)) and also desires (See Harry G.
Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in his THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE
CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 11 (1988) (arguing that our desires are of two orders, firstorder and second-order, and that this hierarchy between our desires is what makes us human, and
accounts for us having free will.)) Finally, Aurel Kolnai argues against a “flattened” view of morals,
criticizing “modern English-speaking” philosophers of the utilitarian school that they “reduce all
value to ‘needs’ or ‘desires’ and their different ‘intensities’ and in their turn, I venture say, seek
preposterously to evade the very concept or Hierarchy... They postulate a flattened world from
which the presence of Verticality is all but wholly excluded” Aurel Kolnai, The Concept of
Hierarchy, in his ETHICS, VALUE AND REALITY: SELECTED PAPERS OF AUREL KOLNAI 165 (1978).
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argument that “balancers” place heavy reliance on.68 The anti-absolutist argument
holds that balancing is always inevitable since no consideration can be given
immunity from balancing. Giving any consideration immunity from balancing
means that all one’s resources would have to be given to this one “unbalanceable”
or “absolute” consideration. Kelman’s framework combined with Raz’s shows
that this kind of argument can hold only with regard to first-order considerations
and not with regard to second-order considerations. Only first-order
considerations have costs and thereby compete with other first-order
considerations over limited resources. Only for a first-order consideration would
it therefore be true that not balancing it with other first-order considerations
would make it absolute since it would mean diverting unlimited resources for its
fulfillment.
However, second-order considerations do not have costs and do not come at
the expense of other considerations. They do not compete in a zero-sum game,
they are not affected by the fact that there are limited societal resources, and they
can all be met. This is so because they are considerations for the exclusion of
interests deemed altogether illegitimate and irrelevant in a particular case. As such
they do not cost anything but rather express an earlier decision on costs.
The anti-absolutist argument is therefore misplaced with regard to an entire
category of practical problems. As with the reducibility argument, it can hold only
at the expense of limiting its scope. The supporting ideologies and arguments for
the balancing consciousness—utilitarianism, pragmatism, economic analysis, and
pluralism—are therefore misplaced with regard to second-order conflicts. When
applied to second-order conflicts they simply misrepresent them, as if they were
first-order conflicts.69
There is another implication of the dual model, which is just as important as
the first. This implication relates to the nature of balancing itself. Balancing
conflicts, the dual model tells us, have a specific character. They are budgetary
conflicts; conflicts over limited resources; conflicts of considerations of the same
68

See, e.g., comment in text accompanying note 20 supra.

69

See infra Part V.B documenting this distortion in constitutional law.
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level, varying in weight but not in kind. We are thus provided with a rudimentary
test for the appropriateness of balancing. In each case, we should ask ourselves,
what is the nature of the conflicting considerations, and what is the nature of the
conflict? Is this a conflict over resources? Can each claim be properly interpreted
as a claim for the allocation of funds to a worthy cause, subject to reasonability?
Or, can we identify one of the considerations as an exclusionary reason—a reason
to reject some other reasons for action—and the conflict as a second-order
conflict of considerations from different levels? Balancing would be appropriate
only in the first kind of conflict.

III. THE DUAL MODEL APPLIED TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Once the dual model is outlined and the balancing consciousness refuted, the
next step is to apply it to constitutional law. This will be the task of this Part.
Constitutional

conflicts

traditionally involve

a

conflict

between a

constitutionally protected right and a governmental or public interest. Following
the dual model, we must ask ourselves therefore in each case of constitutional
conflict—what kind of conflict is this? Can it be properly interpreted as a firstorder conflict over resources? Can both claims in the conflict—the constitutional
rights claim and the governmental interest claim—be properly interpreted as two
legitimate first-order claims fighting over a limited budget? Or, does one of the
claims (the constitutional rights claim, presumably) function as a secondorder/exclusionary reason, which totally excludes the other claim? Balancing is
appropriate only in the first case. It should be rejected in the second.
This Part demonstrates that constitutional cases present both types of
conflicts. That is, some constitutional cases involve first-order conflicts, and
others involve second-order conflicts. Furthermore, for each particular right one
must differentiate between cases in which it appears as a first-order consideration,
and cases in which it appears as a second-order consideration. The discussion
focuses first on free speech, distinguishing first-order free speech claims from
second-order free speech claims. The discussion then moves on to analyze two
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other constitutional areas according to the dual model—dormant commerce clause
and equal protection—and refers to some other possible applications of the dual
model in constitutional law.
A. Free Speech First-Order Claims
Consider a series of free speech cases in the 1940s that involved indirect
limitations on speech and the regulation of time, place and manner of speech. In
these cases, a governmental interest that was unrelated to the content of speech
was the basis of regulation that imposed burdens on speech. For example, in
Schneider v. State,70 a governmental interest in keeping the streets of a city clean
was the basis of a regulation that banned the distribution of handbills in the
streets. This ban, although not directed at the content of speech, was an indirect
burden on speech in that it restricted the place and the manner in which handbills
could be distributed.
Similarly in Kovacs v. Cooper,71 a governmental interest in maintaining quiet
in the streets of a city was the basis of a regulation that restricted the operation of
sound-trucks (trucks equipped with loudspeakers that were used to promote
mayoral candidates). As in Schneider, this ban, although not directed at speech,
resulted in an indirect burden on speech and a restriction on the time, place, and
manner of speech by limiting the communication of ideas to certain designated
uses. Finally, in Cantwell v. Connecticut

72

the governmental interest in

maintaining the privacy of the home and in protecting homeowners from fraud led
to a regulation that required special permits for door-to-door solicitation by a
religious group thus limiting the group’s ability to spread its message.
In all of these cases the Court applied balancing. The Court balanced the
governmental interest with the interest in free speech, which is protected by the
First Amendment. The balancing exercise determined which interest outweighed

70

308 U.S. 147 (1939).

71

336 U.S. 77 (1949).

72

310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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the other, and whether the regulation reflected the proper balance between the
two. Thus, in Schneider, the Court overturned the regulation banning the
distribution of handbills, because it reflected an improper balance between two
interests. The interest of free speech, the Court determined, outweighed the
interest of street cleanliness.73 A similar decision was made in Cantwell with
regard to the interest in maintaining the privacy of the home.74 In Kovacs, on the
other hand, the regulation that banned speech from sound-trucks in the interest of
maintaining quiet was found appropriate by the Court.
However, for our purposes, the importance of these cases is not in the
particular balance struck in each one of them, but rather in the features that made
them amenable to balancing in the first place—i.e., the fact that the free speech
claims in all of these cases were first-order claims, and the conflict a first-order
conflict.
Consider the conflict between the government’s interest and the right to free
speech in Schneider.75 In this case, the interest of keeping streets clean conflicted
with the interest of allowing speech in the form of handbills. This conflict has all
the features of a first-order conflict between two first-order reasons as described
by Raz. The cleanliness interest and the free speech interest are both valid
interests applicable to the case. They conflict because of the special circumstances
of the case, i.e., the fact that distributing handbills causes litter. And therefore a
decision has to be made as to which is a more important or weighty consideration

73

In Schneider, Justice Roberts writes:

We are of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is
insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street
from handing literature to one willing to receive it…The public convenience in respect of
cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the police power which invades the
free communication of information and opinion secured by the Constitution.
308 U.S., at 162-63. (Roberts, J. writing for the Court)
74

The Court determined that the regulation was not “narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed

evil” and laid a “forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.” 310
U.S., at 307.
75

See, supra note 70and accompanying text.
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in the case. In addition, choosing one interest will inevitably be at the expense of
the other interests. In Schneider, the Court admitted that the city would have to
put up with some additional litter in order that free speech be adequately
protected.76
Consider now the analysis of the conflict in Schneider in terms of a claim for
accommodation following Kelman’s analysis. The free speech claim of the
petitioners in Schneider can be regarded as a claim for the accommodation of
speech. That is, they ask that the municipality of their city allocate resources so
that they can have more speech—the municipality should bear the costs of
cleaning the litter caused by the handbills so that the plaintiffs can express their
messages. As such, the petitioners’ claim in Schneider was not an absolute claim.
It had to be reasonable. Hypothetically, if the petitioners’ speech had created an
abundance of litter that brought on exorbitant cleaning costs, the Court would not
have accepted the petitioners’ claim. The entire conflict can therefore be
characterized as a budgetary conflict: both claims—the free speech claim and the
cleanliness interest claim77—are valid claims that cost money. But, since there is a
limited amount of money, a certain distributive decision has to be made, and this
means balancing. By deciding for the petitioners, the Court indicated that in the
special circumstances of that case it was reasonable to expect the municipality to
pay for the accommodation of speech, thus stating that the way the city balanced
the interests was unreasonable.
B. Free Speech Second-Order Claims
The previous analysis showed that certain free speech cases presented free
speech as a typical first-order consideration. However, this description does not
reflect all cases of free speech. Some of the most celebrated early cases of free
76

“Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an

indirect consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of
speech and press.” 308 U.S., at 162.
77

The city’s competing valid interest in the case was the interest in saving money, or the

interest in spending its limited budget on other valid causes.
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speech involved a free speech claim of a different nature. I am referring to cases
that involved what is known as a direct impact on speech, or attempts to control
the content of speech—i.e., to suppress some content or to allow only some
content. This famous line of cases includes Abrams v. United States,78 Gitlow v.
New York,79 and Whitney v. California,80 in which government attempted to
suppress anti-war and pro-socialist content of speech. Another line of free speech
cases involved governmental attempts to suppress pro-communist content of
speech in the 1950s and early 1960s.81 Direct regulation of content was also
involved in cases such as Cohen v. California,82 and Tinker v. Des Moines School
District83 concerning anti-Vietnam -War content of speech. In the FlagDesecration cases,84 the Court dealt with regulations pertaining to the suppression
of messages contemptuous of the American flag. Recent examples of direct
impact on speech exist as well.85
What distinguishes these cases from the line of cases discussed in the
previous section? They involve free speech as a second-order claim, and a
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250 U.S. 616 (1919).

79

268 U.S. 652 (1925).

80

274 U.S. 357(1927).

81

See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Dennis v. United

States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
82

403 U.S. 15 (1971).

83

393 U.S. 503 (1969).

84

Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Spence v.

Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397 (1989) and United States v
Eichman, 496 US 310 (1990).
85

To the list of cases involving direct impact on speech one can add also, R.A.V v. City of St.

Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). See Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality:
R.A.V. v St. Paul, Rust v Sullivan, and the Problem of Content- Based Underinclusion, 1992 S. CT.
REV. 29, and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). For additional cases
see Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996), at 427-8 n. 43, 45.
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second-order conflict between the free speech norm and the governmental
interest. Consequently they do not involve balancing.
In Abrams,86 for example, the free speech interest conflicted with the
government’s interest in protecting against the harmful effects of anti-war
opinions. Such a conflict (as interpreted by Holmes’ famous dissent) has all the
characteristics of a conflict between a second-order reason and a first-order
reason. The free speech interest and the government’s interest are not two valid
interests that differ merely in their weight. Rather, the free speech interest is a
second-order/exclusionary reason that totally excludes the government’s interest
in the case. Holmes interpreted the free speech norm as providing that “the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas [rather than by
allowing] persecution for the expression of opinions”87 Such a free speech norm
makes the government’s interest in protecting against anti-war opinions totally
invalid, rather than a consideration to be balanced with free speech.88 The free
speech interest is a (second-order) reason for the government not to act on the
(first-order) reason that it disagrees with the defendants’ creed. The objection to
the petitioner’s creed is not a consideration that is balanced with the consideration
of free speech. Rather, according to Holmes, “no one has a right even to consider
[the petitioner’s creed] in dealing with the charges before the court.”89 Such
consideration is therefore totally excluded as irrelevant to the case.
Consider now the analysis of the direct impact cases in terms of Kelman’s
analysis of claims against simple discrimination. Holmes’ dissent in Abrams can
be regarded as a repudiation of the discrimination of speech because of its antiwar content, (based on the idea that all opinions must have the opportunity to
86

Supra note 78.

87

Id. at 630.

88

Compare with the following from Justice Black: “The idea of ‘balancing away’ First

Amendment freedoms appears to me to be wholly inconsistent with the view strongly espoused by
Justices Holmes and Brandeis, that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.” Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 81 S. Ct. 997, 1013
(1961) (Justice Black dissenting).
89

250 U.S., at 629-30.
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compete equally in the free market of ideas). The free speech principle, therefore,
operates in Holmes’ dissent as an anti-discrimination principle that absolutely
forbids, rather than balances, a discriminatory motive against speech. And the free
speech claim functions as a claim for abolishing the discriminatory behavior
against speech, rather than as a claim for the allocation of resources for speech in
order to accommodate the need for more speech.
The same analysis is true for the other cases of direct infringement of speech.
If a certain law suppresses (either in its terms or in its application) only those acts
of speech that express a communist point of view, as in the Cold War cases, this
law is discriminating against a communist point of view.90 And if a law favors
only the messages that are conveyed by the American flag, as in the flag burning
cases, it discriminates in favor of this particular content of speech.91 The free
speech anti-discrimination norm in these cases means the total exclusion of the
interest behind the discrimination of the speech, rather than balancing it with the
interest of free speech.
Direct impact on speech cases, such as Abrams, are therefore inappropriate
subjects of balancing because they share the features of second-order conflicts as
identified by the dual model. In cases of direct impact on speech, free speech is a
90

Some of these cases involved regulation that was specifically addressed to the content of

speech (E.g., Dennis involved the Smith Act of 1946 that made it a crime “… to print, publish, edit,
issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any written or printed matter advocating,
advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any
government in the United States by force or violence.” And Douds involved the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947 that specifically targeted a political point of view by requiring officials of
unions who wished to belong to the National Labor Relations Board to take oaths that they did not
belong to the Communist Party. See cases cited supra in notes 78 and 81,) while other cases
involved a regulation that was facially neutral with regard to the content of speech, but was applied
in a manner that singled out speech because of a specific content (for a comprehensive review see
Kagan, supra note 85, at 456-472).
91

See John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and

Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1501, 1506-7 (1975) (arguing that the
anti-flag-burning regulations improperly “single out one set of messages, namely the set of
messages conveyed by the American flag, for protection.”)
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second-order consideration—a consideration of a higher level that excludes other
reasons for action, rather than being balanced with them.
In conclusion, the application of the dual model to free speech cases showed
that free speech is not one thing but two. In some cases free speech is a first-order
consideration, which can be termed the free speech interest. In other cases it is a
second-order consideration, which can be termed the free speech right.92 Each of
these two types of cases follows a different type of logic—the first a balancing
logic, and the second an exclusionary logic.
Did the Court follow this distinction? Did it balance only in first-order
conflicts and exclude in second-order conflicts? While traces of this distinction
are clearly evident in Court opinions of both types,93 and sometimes even
explicitly announced,94 the general rhetoric in modern constitutional law is a
balancing consciousness rhetoric that distorts this distinction.95 That is, both cases
are treated similarly; the solution to any conflict between free speech and a
governmental interest is balancing.96
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Cf. Pildes, supra note 6, at 724 (1994) (“Rights are the means of defining the reasons for

state action that are appropriate in a particular sphere.”)
93

See above passages from Schneider and Abrams.

94

See the following by Jusice Haraln: “[Balancing is applicable only to] general regulatory

statues, not intended to control the content of speech, but incidentally limiting its unfettered
exercise.” Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961) (Harlan, J. writing for the Court)
95

See, e.g., the following quote from Chief Justice Rehnquist: “We cannot know for certain the

sort of issues with which the Court will grapple in the third century of its existence. But there is no
reason to doubt that it will continue as a vital and uniquely American institutional participant in the
everlasting search of civilized society for the proper balancing between liberty and authority,
between the state and the individual” W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT--HOW IT WAS, HOW IT
IS 319 (1987).
96

Professor Tushnet conveys this impression when he writes in 1985 that “a recent symposium

on First Amendment theory is pervaded by comments that the balancing debate is over and that
everyone knows that free speech law must be developed through the use of balancing”. Mark V.
Tushnet, Anti Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 1531 (1985).
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Before discussing how this came about, and what its implications are, let us
consider further evidence with regard to the application of the dual model to other
constitutional rights.
C. Dormant Commerce Clause and Equal Protection
This section will consider two further applications of the dual model to
constitutional law and refer to some other possible applications. That is, it will
show that several other constitutional rights have a dual aspect that has to be
distinguished with regard to balancing. Such rights can generate either first-order
claims for the allocation of resources to the right, subject to balancing, or secondorder claims for the abolition of illegitimate governmental objectives, not subject
to balancing.
1. The first area of constitutional law to be considered here is commerce
clause jurisprudence. The dual model identifies the following two levels of
commerce clause considerations. There is a first-order commerce clause
consideration (that can be termed the commerce clause interest,) and there is a
second-order commerce clause consideration (that can be termed the commerce
clause right). The first-order commerce clause interest is the interest in having
free commerce across state lines (it can be held either by a private commercial
actor who wishes not to have her commerce burdened, or by Congress as a
national interest in having free movement of goods between states).97 The secondorder commerce clause right is the right not to have trade restricted due to
protectionist state motives. In other words, it is the right not to have trade
restricted because of a state’s wish to prefer local economic actors over foreign
economic actors.98

97

See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the

Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1103-4 (1986).
98

Donald Regan defines a protectionist purpose as “the purpose of improving the competitive

position of local (in-state) economic actors, just because they are local, vis-à-vis their foreign
(…mean[ing]… out-of-state) competitors.” Regan, supra note 97,at 1094-95.
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The interest of free commerce along state lines is a reason to act in the
furtherance of a certain good (free interstate commerce) to the extent possible
under the circumstances. It is limited by its nature, and subject to balancing with
other valid interests. One cannot avoid having some limitations on trade across
state lines, and abolishing such limitations necessarily comes at the expense of
other important interests, such as preventing illegal smuggling, collecting taxes,
and so on. It therefore functions as a first-order consideration only. However, the
right against protectionist motives is a reason to totally exclude certain other
reasons for action (protectionist reasons). The right against protectionist motives
is not restricted in the same way as the interest in free interstate commerce. It is
not balanced with, but rather totally excludes, those motives for governmental
action that are based on protectionism. It therefore functions as a secondorder/exclusionary right.
These two types of commerce clause considerations generate first-order
commerce clause conflicts and second-order commerce clause conflicts. Firstorder commerce clause cases are cases involving a conflict between the (firstorder) interest of free interstate commerce and another (first-order) interest. An
example would be Southern Pacific Company Co. v. Arizona.99 This case
involved a law limiting the length of trains in order to avoid accidents associated
with long trains. The law conflicted with the interest of free interstate commerce,
because it imposed high costs on railroad companies operating trains that crossed
state lines. Both the national interest of free interstate commerce and the interest
in preventing accidents functioned as first-order interests in the case. They were
both valid claims for the promotion of a certain good as much as possible under
the circumstances. They both had costs in terms of other valid claims, and they
incidentally conflicted in the case. The case was therefore a balancing case and
the Court balanced the two considerations.100
99

325 U.S. 761 (1945).

100

Justice Stone used balancing writing for the Court that the effect of the regulation was not

enough to “outweigh the protection of the interest [of interstate commerce] safeguarded by the
commerce clause.” Id., at 770.
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Second-order commerce clause cases are cases involving the secondorder/exclusionary anti-protectionist principle conflicting with the firstorder/excluded interest in favoring local commercial actors over out-of-state
commercial actors. Such a conflict would be a logical conflict, rather than an
incidental conflict of costs and would be resolved by excluding the protectionist
interest altogether, rather than by balancing. Arguably, many commerce clause
cases are such cases.101 An example is Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission102 in which a North Carolina statute forbade the use of
certain grades of apples that Washington State apple growers were famous for.
The Court’s opinion reads like an accusation that this law was motivated by an
illegitimate protectionist motive, and it invalidates the motive.103
2. The second area of constitutional law to be considered here is the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, and the constitutional principle
of equality. The constitutional principle of equality can also be regarded as
espousing two kinds of considerations: a first-order consideration in having as
much equality in society as possible under the circumstances (the equality
interest) and a second -order/exclusionary principle that totally excludes, rather
than balances, discriminatory motives (the equality right).
The equality interest has several well-known manifestations in equal
protection theory. It is sometimes referred to as the principle of substantive
equality, and it includes the principles of accommodation, discussed in length
earlier, and also the principle of affirmative action.104 Both the principle of
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See Regan, supra note 97, at 1092: “in the central area of dormant commerce clause

jurisprudence… the Court has been concerned exclusively with preventing states from engaging in
purposeful economic protectionism.”
102
103

432 U.S. 333 (1977).
See Regan, supra note 97, at 1221-28, interpreting the Court’s rhetoric as an anti-

protectionist rhetoric. “The underlying concern with suppressing protectionism is perfectly visible to
whoever will look.”
104

See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, Equality and Free Speech: The Case Against Substantive

Equality, 82 IOWA L. REV. 645 (1997) (describing interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment as
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accommodation and the principle of affirmative action manifest the wish to
promote equality in society among its different social groups. Both principles are,
however, limited in nature, since they require social resources for their
implementation, and since they would necessarily conflict with other valid social
interests. The interest in promoting equality between black and white people,
which stands behind affirmative action programs, might for example, conflict
with the interest in meritocracy in education.105 The interest in accommodation,
discussed at length in Part II, may conflict with other societal interests that require
resources.106
The second-order/exclusionary right against discrimination however, is not
limited in the same way. The right against discriminatory motives is a reason to
totally exclude discriminatory reasons for action. As such, it is not balanced with,
but rather totally excludes, those motives for governmental action that are based
on discrimination.
These two manifestations of the equality principle generate first-order equal
protection cases and second-order equal protection cases. First-order equal
protection cases are cases involving a conflict between the first-order interest of
accommodation, or of affirmative action, and a governmental first-order interest.
An example would be University of California v. Bakke.

107

In this case, the

interest in promoting the equality of black people in American society conflicted
with the interests of meritocracy, and also with the interest of the claimant, a
white student, to be admitted to University. The interest of affirmative action, as
well as the interest of meritocracy and the interest of the white student to be
accepted to the University, functioned as first-order interests in the case. They

espousing substantive equality and a right to affirmative action, and arguing that such interpretations
may conflict with the right to free speech).
105

See generally Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom? 47 STAN L. REV.

855 (1995).
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See supra II.B especially the discussion of the second difference between accommodation

claims and simple discrimination claims on page 19.
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438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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were all valid claims for the maximal promotion of certain goods under the
circumstances. They all had costs in terms of other valid claims, and they
incidentally conflicted in the case. The case was therefore a balancing equal
protection case. 108
Second-order equal protection cases are cases involving the second-order
anti- discrimination principle conflicting with a first-order/excluded interest in
discriminating. Such a conflict is a logical conflict, rather than an incidental
conflict of costs and is resolved by excluding the discriminatory interest
altogether, rather than by balancing. Probably the most notable such case is
Brown v. Board of Education.109 The Court argued, in effect, that the separation
between black and white students involved in the case, was motivated by
illegitimate discriminatory motives, and that such motives should be totally
invalidated, rather than balanced.110
Additional areas of constitutional law that can be interpreted according to the
dual model include, the establishment clause,111 the constitutional right to

108

Since affirmative action plans are not motivated by illegitimate discriminatory motives, but

rather by a legitimate motive of accommodation, persons badly affected by them do not hold a
second-order right to exclude them. The harm caused by those plans to white students is analogous
to the indirect harms, caused by regulations not aimed at speech, to those who’s speech is being
restricted. Such harm is a valid first-order claim that should be balanced against opposing first-order
considerations, but it does not espouse a second-order right to totally exclude opposing
considerations. Compare Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997).
109

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

110

See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 998 (arguing that Brown is not a balancing case.) There is

also another reading of the case, according to which it involves balancing. This reading is supported
by certain passages in the Court’s opinion. However, I will argue that these passages misrepresent
the real reasoning in the case, and do not reflect the proper reading of the case. See supra note 176
and accompanying text.
111

Compare Pildes, supra note 6, at 725-727, 750 (“the ‘right’ to freedom of religious

conscience means that government may not act for the purpose of endorsing religion or religious
sects.”)
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privacy,112 the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions113 the right to vote,114 and
the right to travel.115

IV. THE HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING
Part III proved the claim that all (or most) constitutional rights do in fact
generate both first-order (balanceable) and second-order (non-balanceable)
claims. Or, alternatively, that each right is (potentially at least) both a right and an
interest. This Part addresses the second claim that was made with regard to
constitutional balancing: the claim that current constitutional doctrine fails to
differentiate between the two types of constitutional claims because of the
balancing consciousness. Rather than proving this second claim directly, this Part
first explains how this confusion came about through a historical review of
balancing in American constitutional law. Once the historical background for the
confusion is understood it will become easier to outline the exact manifestations
of the confusion in current constitutional law, which will be the task of Part V.
A. Early Balancing
Balancing’s origins are usually identified with the appearance of the
progressive movement in American legal thought in the early 20th century and
with some of its leading figures, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound

112

Compare Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989)

(distinguishing between an interest in having maximal freedom from governmental intrusion into
one’s privacy, and the much stronger right not to have one’s privacy restricted because of
illegitimate governmental motives).
113

Compare Pildes, supra note 6, at 736-742.

114

Compare Id. at 741-745.

115

Compare C. Edwin Baker, Limitations on Basic Human Rights—A View From the United

States, in THE LIMITATION

OF

HUMAN RIGHTS

IN

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75, 82-4

(1986) (arguing that the “right” to travel is only affected if the regulation restricting travel is based
on illegitimate motives.)

THE DUAL MODEL OF BALANCING

46

and Harland Fiske Stone.116 In order to understand the role that balancing played
in progressive thought and the exact use the progressives made of balancing one
must understand the general agenda of progressivism in constitutional law.
Progressive jurisprudence in constitutional law was a reaction to late 19th
century constitutional jurisprudence and to what is now known as the Lochner
era.117 The Lochner era Court notoriously interpreted the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as banning almost any kind of governmental regulation of
the market. It regarded any such regulation (setting maximum working hours in
bakeries, for example118) as an unconstitutional abridgment of the right to
contract, which is part of the liberty of the individual and therefore protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The progressives viewed such constitutional interpretation as an usurpation of
judicial power. They accused the Lochner era Justices of “perverting” the words
of the Constitution to suit their own free market ideology of laissez fair.119 The
progressives countered this accusation with the concept of balancing. The Court,
they argued, interpreted constitutional rights as if they were unambiguous hard

116

See HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 18-19 (“The emergence of balancing tests in numerous areas

of the law is a prominent measure of the success of Progressive legal thinkers in undermining
categorical thought”); Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 948, 955 (“[B]alancing was a major break with
the past, responding to the collapse of nineteenth century conceptualism and formalism…Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the patron saint of all the various antiformalist schools, had fired the first
salvos…Roscoe Pound broadened and deepened Holmes' attack”); Progressive balancing however is
not one thing. One can distinguish two strands within progressive balancing, separating for example,
Holmes’ balancing from Pound’s balancing. See Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The
Holmesian Judge In Theory And Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19, 35-36 (1995).
117

The era receives its name from the famous case, Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905),

in which the Court repealed the New York Labor Law, which set maximum working hours in
bakeries.
118
119

See Id.
See Justice Holmes’ famous words in his dissent in Lochner: "[A] Constitution is not

intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of
the citizen to the state or of laissez faire... I think that the word 'liberty,' in the 14th Amendment, is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion"
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and fast rules that totally banned governmental regulatory policies, while, in
effect, such rights were only standards or policies that had to be balanced with
conflicting governmental policies.120
“The great constitutional guarantees of personal liberty and of property… are
but statements of standards,” argued Justice Harland Fiske Stone, “they do not
prescribe formulas to which governmental action must conform.”121 And Roscoe
Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School, wrote that it was only the ambiguity of
the word “right” that allowed such rights as the right to contract to be interpreted
as principles that are elevated above policy considerations. These “so called
rights” argued Pound were but “individual claims, individual interests... on no
lower plane [than the governmental policies that conflicted with them.]… There is
a policy in the one case as much as in the other.”122 The standard for resolving
constitutional conflicts, Pound concluded, must therefore be “a weighing or
balancing of the various interests which overlap or come in conflict and a rational
reconciling or adjustment.”123
This review of progressive balancing shows that the progressives used
balancing in a way that was consistent with the dual model. Balancing was used
to indicate that certain rights claims—claims under the due process clause, for
example—functioned, in effect, as first-order claims only, and not as real rights
claims. Due process claims, for example, were claims for the maximal furtherance
of one social goal, one policy (liberty of contract) subject to reasonableness, and
to balancing with other social goals and policies (such as equality in the job
market). Such first-order policies were not elevated above any other first-order
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See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 953.
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Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23-24 (1936).
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Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1943) (the paper was

originally presented in 1921) (emphasis added).
123

Id. at 53.
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policies. The pretence that they were so elevated, argued the progressives, was
due only to the ambiguity of the term “right.”124
Furthermore, the recognition that the matter was a matter of balancing led the
progressives to the conclusion that balancing should be taken out of the hands of
the Court altogether. How so? The Progressives argued that since the matter was a
matter of policy, the Court should leave the matter completely to the legislative
majority. This was another reaction to the jurisprudence of the Lochner era.
In the Lochner case, for example, the Court warned against subjecting
constitutional rights, such as the right to the liberty of contract, to “the mercy of
legislative majorities… [whenever there existed] the mere fact of the possible
existence of some small amount of [damage to the public interest].”125 The
progressives, on the other hand, thought that legislative majorities were fully
entitled to have rights such as the right to liberty of contract at their mercy, since
such rights were properly characterized as general standards of policy, rather than
higher-level hard and fast rules. Holmes, therefore, famously accused the Court in
Lochner of interfering with “the right of the majority to embody their opinions in
law.”126 Pound, as previously mentioned, argued that “there was as much policy in
the one case as in the other” (referring to rights and governmental interests).127
And the logical result of this line of argument to balancing was formulated by a
latter day progressive Justice as follows: “[i]t is not our province to choose among

124

Compare with Duncan Kennedy's similar description of the shift in private law

jurisprudence in the 1940s: “One of the most striking developments of the 1940s was the
transformation of the ‘formalist’ requirements of the will theory… into mere policies to be balanced
within the larger analysis.” Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal
Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western
Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1073-74 (2004).
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Supra note at 59 (Justice Peckham referring to the damage to the public interest in public

health).
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Id. at 75.
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Pound, supra note 122.
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competing considerations… [P]rimary responsibility for adjusting the interests…
of necessity belongs to the Congress.”128
Rather than the tyranny of the majority over rights the progressives were
afraid of the tyranny of rights over the majority. The individual rights rhetoric,
they argued, was the Court’s tool in blocking the majority vote on issues of public
policy. Balancing was the antidote—a way to uncover the mask of impartial and
unfiltered interpretation of the Constitution and show that it was in fact filtered by
the Court’s own ideological balancing. Once the problem was identified as a firstorder/balanceable conflict of policy, the progressives felt that the Court should
leave the matter to the legislature, and not interfere with majoritarian balancing.129

128

Justice Frankfurter in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis , 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940), and

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951).
129

See Grey, supra note 137, at 513-4 (“in Progressive jurisprudence… the policy dimension

was integrated with a modest view of the role that… judges should play in the democratic
lawmaking…The Progressive legislature had primary responsibility for making policy…; the main
job of the Progressive… judges was to apply the rules laid down in legislation.”)
The above analysis of progressive balancing may raise the following question. How is it, one
may ask, that judicial balancing is so closely associated with the progressives if the only thing they
did was expose it and argue against it? The answer is that judicial balancing is associated with
progressive balancing in private law, rather than in constitutional law. In private law, progressives
saw a way to justify balancing by the judiciary, which was consistent with their identification of
balancing with first-order, policy-oriented conflicts. For in private law, unlike in constitutional law,
it was often the case that the legislature did not balance, but simply left matters unresolved. When
undecided matters came to the Court it had to fill in the gaps that the legislature left, and in doing so
it was acting, in effect, as a legislator and was therefore justified in using balancing. Constitutional
cases, however, presented no such gaps. They were concerned with the review of decisions already
made by the legislator. Constitutional cases were not about filling legislative voids, but about setting
aside legislative decisions, and this, according to the progressives, could not have been done through
balancing. The association of the progressives with constitutional balancing is therefore wrongly
based on their view on balancing in private law. (I thank Thomas Grey for this observation.)
Compare Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 948 (“Such methodology [balancing] may be an appropriate
model for common law adjudication. But balancing needs to be defended in constitutional
interpretation where the decision of a court supplants a legislative decision;”) Melville B. Nimmer,
The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied
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B. Modern Balancing and the Rise of the Balancing Consciousness
This initial use of balancing, which I term early balancing, however, soon
shifted and balancing became associated not with anti-rights rhetoric and judicial
restraint, but with the opposite—rights rhetoric and judicial activism. This new
phase of balancing, which is ongoing, will be referred to as modern balancing.
Modern balancing first appeared in constitutional law relatively early. It
occurred in a line of free speech cases starting in the late 1930s discussed above
and identified as first-order free speech cases.130 The Schneider case will be
discussed here again since it is the best representation of the shift between early
balancing and modern balancing and the emergence of the balancing
consciousness. 131
Recall that the Court in Schneider identified the problem presented by the
case as a problem of balancing between free speech and the interest of
cleanliness.132 Knowing early balancing we would expect that once the case had
been identified as a balancing case we would witness judicial claims such as the
claim that the right is as much a policy as the conflicting interest, that the interest
is on no lower plane than the right, and that the matter should be left to the
legislature.133 In the judicial rhetoric of Schneider, however, we find the exact
opposite. The Schneider opinion opens with a declaration that is more
representative of the Lochner era’s rights rhetoric than of its progressive critics:
This Court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as
fundamental personal rights and liberties. [Therefore,] mere legislative
preferences of beliefs respecting matters of public convenience … [are]
insufficient to justify [the invasion of free speech.] And so, as cases arise the

to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 939 (1968) (“Such an approach [balancing] may well be desirable
with respect to nonconstitutional issues—in fact, it appears to be basic to the common law system.”)
130

See supra notes 70- 72and accompanying text.
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Schneider v. State. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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See Schneider Id.
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See supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
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delicate and difficult task [of balancing the interest and the right] falls upon the
court.

134

Not only is the right to free speech not lowered to the status of a policy
interest, as it was during early balancing, it is raised above “mere legislative
preferences,” so that a special burden is put on government to justify its invasion.
Furthermore, the judicial deference is gone, and balancing is assigned squarely to
the Court whenever the right of free speech is being implicated.
In terms of the dual model we have a problem. We find, on the one hand,
rhetoric that is more consistent with a second-order/exclusionary interpretation of
rights, certainly not with the idea of rights as same-level claimants for public
resources. And, on the other hand, we find the actual decision made, as shown
earlier, in terms of a first-order conflict—cleanliness and free speech are
competing contenders for public resources and the matter is a matter of balancing.
In fact what we witness in Schneider is the emergence of modern balancing
and the balancing consciousness in constitutional law. No longer is balancing
identified only with the first-order conception of rights, as in the progressive era,
but with any conception of rights, indeed with the conception of rights generally.
In this new attitude towards balancing, balancing rights and interests has become
the principal judicial task in constitutional law,135 without distinguishing between
first-order and second-order types of rights. The result is the application of both
balancing and rights rhetoric across the board in all types of constitutional cases,
which has characterized modern balancing ever since.
Why did this change in balancing take place? In the following I will briefly
address this question. I propose that this change occurred as a result of the
following sequence of historical events.
By the late 1930s the battle against the Lochner era Court and its ideology of
economic laissez fair that first triggered the use of balancing was over. New
Justices were appointed to the Court and the new Court stopped actively
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Schneider, at 153-4.

135

See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 1.
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protecting laissez fair rights, and adopted the balancing rhetoric of its critics.136
However, by that time, a new set of problems had emerged. The European
experience surrounding Nazi Germany and WWII brought the need to protect
minority rights from the tyranny of the majority to the American consciousness.
Rather than the minoritarian tyranny involved in free-market activism by the
Court, the European experience stressed the danger of majoritarian tyranny over
the civil and political rights of minorities.137 A new rhetoric of rights emerged, but
this time, rather than being opposed to the rhetoric of balancing, it converged with
it. This was so, because the balancing rhetoric was already imbedded in the new
Court’s judicial worldview as part of its objection to the old Court. The result was
that the use of balancing became identified with minority rights’ struggles (such
as the free speech struggle of Jehovah Witnesses, the black civil rights movement,
and the free speech struggle of the Vietnam War protestors) despite of the fact
that it was first designed to deal with majoritarian problems and was appropriate
for such problems.138
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See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 76 (1998)

(“The New Deal Justices, appointed by Presidnet franklin Delano Roosvelt all agreed on one point:
that the so-called Lochner era was a disaster.”)
137

See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 Yale L.J. 493, 502-3

(1996) (“the Nazi and Stalinist use of… a subservient political judiciary… increasingly dramatized
the centrality of due process and legality to liberal democracy and put the Progressive and Realist
jurists whose theories neglected or seemed to undermine these values on the defensive…A new
liberal rule of law agenda began to emerge as the Court signaled its willingness to expand the ideal
of equal justice under law to society’s outcasts and underdogs, its “discreet and insular minorities”.)
Compare also with HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 247 (“post-war legal thought was powerfully shaped
by efforts to square the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) with the
half-century-old, post-Lochner, Progressive commitment to judicial restraint.”) The emphasis on
minority rights was later strengthened by the emergence of the civil rights movement and the revival
of rights-based moral and political philosophy in the early 1970s. See Grey, Id. at 505.
138

The continued use of balancing in the post-New Deal era is best represented in the

jurisprudence of Justice Felix Frnakfurter. See the discussion of Frnakfurter's use of balancing in the
Dennis case, supra notes 157-167 and accompanying text.
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This explanation therefore suggests a path dependency problem concerning
balancing. Once the path of balancing was taken, the Court kept using balancing,
despite changed circumstances which made its use problematic. The kinds of
confusions that this path dependency led to are explored below.

V. THE TWO PROBLEMS OF MODERN BALANCING
Part III showed that constitutional rights generate both first-order
(balanceable) and second-order (non-balanceable) claims. Part IV showed that
modern balancing fails to differentiate between these two types of rights claims
because of the balancing consciousness. This final Part of the Article will
document the two major problems that this failure has generated within
constitutional law.
Since the balancing consciousness fails to differentiate between first-order
and second-order rights it results in the following two distortions. First, as already
alluded to in the case of Schneider, the balancing consciousness misapplies
second-order/rights logic to first-order/interest conflicts. That is, it elevates a firstorder interest claim to the level of a second-order rights claim (the first-to-second
order mix-up). It does so by treating an intra-level conflict between two first-order
interests (the constitutional interest and the governmental interest), as an interlevel conflict, in which the constitutional interest is elevated above the
governmental interest, and the governmental interest subjected to high burdens of
proof, high levels of scrutiny and the like.139 Secondly, the balancing
consciousness also brings about the opposite, no less problematic, distortion; it
applies first-order/interest logic, to second-order/rights conflicts. That is, it lowers
an actual second-order rights claim to the level of a mere interest claim, by
subjecting it to the logic of first-order balancing (the second-to-first order mix-

139

In fact this distortion is the same distortion of which the progressives accused the Lochner

Court– reading too much into the right. The only difference is that now it is done through balancing,
and not through a more categorical judicial rhetoric, so that balancing is actually instrumental in
supporting an inappropriate non-balancing solution.
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up). Both distortions are omnipresent in constitutional law ever since the
emergence of modern balancing. The following is a review of examples of both
distortions in the three areas of constitutional law that were discussed in Part III—
free speech, the commerce clause, and equal protection.
A. Confusing First-Order with Second-Order Rights claims (The First-to-Second
Order Mix-Up).
1. Free Speech
Consider the Schneider case again,140 and how the balancing consciousness
distorted the conflict that it actually presented. The application of the dual model
showed that in Schneider free speech was a first-order claim. There was no
excluded or illegitimate consideration involved in the conflict (such as
illegitimately targeting speech because of its content). The free speech claim
amounted only to a claim for directing resources to speech by excusing the speech
activity from anti-litter regulations and making the city pay for more cleaning.
However, as shown earlier, the Court, stressing that free speech was a
“fundamental personal right,” placed the free speech interest at a higher position
than the governmental interest, and stressed that “mere governmental preferences”
were not enough to overcome free speech.141 This created an unnatural distortion
in the nature of the conflict in the Schneider case, and overstated the strength of
the free speech claim that it involved.
The rights rhetoric mistakenly made the free speech claim involved in
Schneider seem as if it were different in nature than any other claim for social
resources to a worthy cause, and it portrayed the governmental decision as if it
involved something different than a policy decision, or a budgetary decision,
regarding the allocation of resources between speech and several other worthy
societal values.
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See supra note 70.
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See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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An example can illustrate this point. Think of a technology institute that
created litter and also wished to be excused from anti-litter regulation, or an
educational facility that created litter, or any other type of activity that we would
want to encourage and also caused litter. Why should these activities be in an
inferior position to a speech activity, such as distributing handbills, so that they
could not equally compete for public resources in the form of excusing them from
anti- litter regulations? Or, at least, why should the decision to excuse a speech
activity from anti-litter regulation, and not these other socially important
activities, be described as following from the fundamental right to free speech,
rather than as a policy decision analogous to a decision about whether to sponsor
a new Hyde Park so that there could be more speech, or to sponsor a new
technology institute or school so that there could be more education or more
science?
It seems, therefore, that the claim of free speech for higher status in cases
such as Schneider emanates from cases such as Abrams, in which free speech is a
second-order claim for abolishing illegitimate content-based restriction of speech.
In such cases, as shown at length in Part III, free speech is indeed elevated above
the conflicting interest of content based restriction of speech, because it is a
second-order reason to exclude the illegitimate governmental reason altogether.
But this special status is mistakenly applied, because of the coupling of the
balancing consciousness and the rights rhetoric, to cases such as Schneider, in
which speech is only a first-order reason for the allocation of resources.142
142

Consider another hypothetical case to better illustrate the problems of overstating a first-

order free speech claim. Suppose a case involved a filmmaker that was in debt and faced
bankruptcy. He argues constitutional protection of his free speech right against applying bankruptcy
law to his case, since bankruptcy would not enable him to finish his film. No one suspects that the
bankruptcy laws were devised in order to curb the message in his film, which is of no concern to
anyone in the case. His claim is therefore a typical first-order free speech claim. It is a claim that
society pays for his speech, in this case filmmaking, by relieving him of debt. But, since rightsbased balancing does not distinguish between first-order and second-order free speech claims, his
case would be treated as a case of infringing the fundamental right to free speech. This would imply
that especially strong justifications must be presented to justify his creditors collecting from the
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This first-to-second order mix-up in Schneider also has implications in terms
of the justifications for judicial review. The mischaracterization of the case as a
second-order/rights-oriented case may inappropriately strengthen the justifications
for judicial review in the case, since rights-oriented infringements seem to carry
with them greater justifications for judicial review than policy-oriented cases.143
The uncovering of the true nature of the case as a first-order/policy case, may
suggest, therefore, that weaker justifications for judicial review existed in the
case, than those that the Court portrayed.144 It may even suggest that the case
should not have been regarded as within the scope of the First Amendment at
all.145
filmmaker—justifications which are different in their strength from justification for collecting debts
from any other regular debtor. The rights rhetoric may even suggest that a creditor, who holds only a
regular interest in getting his money back, should prove that his interest in getting his money back
justifies the burdening of such a fundamental interest as speech.
Obviously his does not make sense. At the very least, one could say, that even if we would
want a policy to have special debt reductions or tax reductions for people engaged in speech, this
would not analytically follow from the idea of protecting the fundamental right to free speech. But,
since modern balancing and the balancing consciousness do not differentiate between first-order and
second-order speech claims, they do not give us the proper tools to show why the filmmakers’
hypothetical claim should be properly disregarded.
143

See, e.g., the progressive view on judicial review, supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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John Ely, for example, seems to have suggested that cases of indirect regulation of speech,

such as Schneider, which I identify as first-order cases, deserve a more lenient standard of review
that direct regulation of speech, such as the Flag Desecration cases, that I identify as second-order
cases. See Ely, supra note 91. Compare also with Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment
Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1256 (1995).
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Several First Amendment theorists have promoted interpretations of the First Amendment,

which resemble the idea that first-order free speech cases are not free speech cases at all. Such are
theorists which believe that the main concern of the First Amendment is the protection against
message-based censorship, and that the main question in First Amendment law, should be whether
such message-based censorship was the basis of the governmental regulation of speech. Non
content-based regulations, time place and manner regulations, and indirect infringements of speech,
such as the ones involved in Schneider, are, according to such analyses completely outside the scope
of First Amendment protection. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Limitations on Basic Human Rights—A
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Note that such conclusions do not logically follow from the dual model’s
distinctions. The dual model only directs attention to the fact that the conflict
should be properly regarded as first-order conflict and that the rights claim in the
conflict should be properly regarded as a claim for the allocation of resources
rather than as a typical rights claim. One may still hold the view that even in such
policy
- oriented conflicts the Court is justified in interfering with the legislative
balance. What one cannot do, however, is use justifications for judicial review
that rely on second-order rights claims to justify judicial review in first-order
rights claims.146
RIGHTS

IN

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75, at 80, 87 (1986) (“The right [of free speech]

would not be a right to speak but a right to have the government not aim at suppressing speech…
[Therefore] the government’s use of a time, place or manner regulation [of speech] should not in
itself be taken as a limitation on the right of speech. Rather, an abridgment or limitation occurs only
if the restriction of expressive conduct is the government’s purpose.”) See also Jed Rubenfeld, The
First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001) (arguing that regulations not aimed at the
suppression of the content of speech are outside the scope of the First Amendment,) and Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 415 (1996) (arguing for the centrality of governmental purpose to
suppress the content of speech, in First Amendment law.)
146

See also discussion in the CONCLUSION. There is another possible interpretation of the

Schneider case, which would allow judicial review based on second-order justifications after all.
According to this interpretation, the Schneider case was not a first-order case but a second-order
case, since the real aim of the regulation was not avoiding litter but targeting the message of the
handbills. This interpretation relies on the fact that some of the claimants in the case were Jehovah
Witnesses. The balancing/first-order language is, according to this interpretation, only a means to
‘smoke-out’ an illicit intent to curb the message of speech, hidden by the neutral language of the
regulation. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Notes for a Theory of Constrained Balancing in First
Amendment Cases: An Essay in Honor of Tome Emerson, 38 CASE WEST. RESERVE L. REV. 576,
582 (1988) (“I suspect that many judges, lacking hard evidence of motive, use [balancing] as
evidentiary shorthand that generates a degree of doubt as to the censor's true motive… When a
balancing court sets aside an anti-littering ordinance, it is often because it senses an unacceptably
high level of risk that a political majority has proffered an asserted interest in clean streets as a
pretext to limit disfavored or annoying speech.”); Compare Rubenfeld Id. at 831-2 (arguing that
Schneider involved message-based regulation); Compare Regan supra note 98(arguing for the
‘smoking-out’ function of balancing in commerce clause law). Such analyses of the ‘smoking-out’
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2. Dormant Commerce Clause
The first-to-second order mix-up is even more obvious in the area of the
dormant commerce clause than in the free speech area. Consider the case of
Arizona that was discussed in Part III.147 The dual model identified the conflict in
that case as a first-order conflict between safety and free interstate commerce—
the Arizona regulation of standard length trains increased interstate commerce
costs, but decreased safety risks. There was no indication of an illegitimate
protectionist motive to prefer local train companies to out-of-state train companies
in banning long trains in Arizona.148 Nevertheless, if one examines the judicial
rhetoric in the case, one finds that the Court subjected the interest of safety to
special justifications that it had to overcome in order for it to defeat the commerce
clause interest in the balance. It justified these special burdens by arguing that the
commerce clause interest was a constitutional right and that therefore special
justifications were needed in order for conflicting policies (such as safety) to
overcome it.149

function of balancing do not contradict the dual model, but rather can be imposed on the model as
an overlay.
147

Southern Pacific Company Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761. See supra note 99 and

accompanying text.
148

Recall that the discussion in Part III.C distinguished between the first-order commerce

clause interest, which is the interest in promoting swift interstate commerce, and the second-order
commerce clause right, which was a right against protectionism of local industry over out-of-state
industry.
149

See 325 U.S. 770-71:

The matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and extent of the burden which
the state regulation of interstate trains… imposes on interstate commerce, and whether the
relative weights of the state and national interests involved are such as to make
inapplicable the rule, generally observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce and its
freedom from local restraints… are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause from
state interference.
(Stone, J. writing for the Court).
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However, once the first-order nature of the commerce claim in Arizona is
realized, it is hard to see why the commerce clause interest should receive such
prima facie higher status than other considerations, such as safety. After all, as a
first-order interest in promoting the swift commerce between states, interstate
commerce is burdened in numerous ways, most of them quite unproblematic
(health inspections, drug trafficking inspections, even speeding laws, all burden
the swift transport of goods between one state and another). Is it really the case
that in all of these cases we would wish to grant a special status to the commerce
clause interest, so that other interests, such as safety or health, would have to be
especially strong in order to overcome it in the balance? Or, at the very least,
should the question of which interest to promote be framed any differently than a
question of policy, or a budgetary question of allocating resources? 150
It seems therefore that, as in the area of free speech, a special status is
inappropriately attributed to first-order commerce clause claims in cases such as
Arizona as a result of confusing them with second-order commerce clause cases.
In second-order commerce clauses cases the commerce clause claim is indeed
elevated above the governmental interest. This is so, since the governmental
interest in such cases is an illegitimate protectionist interest, which is totally
excluded by the commerce clause interest. But, first-order commerce clause cases
present claims of a different nature. They do not argue protectionist motive, but
only seek to further the interest of swift interstate commerce. The coupling of the
balancing consciousness and the rights rhetoric distorts this fact. 151
150

See Id. (“the determination [of the length of trains] is a matter of public policy”) (Black, J.

dissenting).
151

See Regan, supra note 97, at 1128 (“When we say every producer ought to have access to

all the country's markets, what we mean is just that he should not be shut out of any market by
preferential trade regulations directed against him as a foreigner… If [a] law incidentally diverts
some business to local producers, that is a matter of no constitutional significance.”); See Bendix
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (“The scale analogy is not really
appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment.
Expressing hostility towards judicial balancing in commerce clause jurisprudence, and preferring
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As with free speech, the uncovering of a case as a first-order case may
suggest that justifications for judicial review were overstated in the case and that
balancing should be left to the legislature. It may also suggest that the case is of
no constitutional concern at all.152 Justice Black therefore concludes his analyses
of the Arizona case by arguing: “the balancing of these probabilities, however, is
not in my judgment a matter of judicial determination, but one that calls for
legislative consideration.”153
3. Equal Protection
The first-to-second order mix-up is also evident in the third area of
constitutional law that was reviewed in Part III—equal protection. A good
example for this mix-up is the famous Bakke case that was analyzed in Part III.154
In this case, a white medical student claimed to hold a strong equal protection
right against applying the affirmative action plan to his case. The Court agreed,
and interpreted his claim as a high-status rights claim. Consequently the Court
subjected the conflicting interest—the interest behind the affirmative action
plan—to strict scrutiny.155 However, the dual model analysis in Part III shows that
Bakke involved only a first-order conflict between two, same-level considerations:
the interest behind the affirmative action plan (a diverse student body, for
example) and the conflicting interest that was burdened by the plan (meritocracy
in higher education, for example). Bakke’s claim therefore did not espouse
illegitimate, animus-based simple discrimination against white people. It
instead a rule against facially discriminatory laws.)
152

See Regan Id; Southern Pacific Company Co. v. Arizona (“The fact that grade crossing

improvement [improvements associated with the move to shorter trains] may be expensive is no
sufficient reason to say than an unconstitutional ‘burden’ is put upon a railroad even though it be an
interstate road.”) (Black, J. dissenting).
153

325 U.S. 794.

154

Bakke v. California, 438 U.S. 265. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

155

Id. at 291 (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for

the most exacting judicial examination.") (Justice Powell casting the crucial fifth vote in a divided
Court).
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espoused only a policy consideration (meritocracy) that was burdened by the
affirmative action plan. Therefore it should not have been accorded the same
status as a simple discrimination (second-order) claim. In terms of judicial review,
this realization is translated into arguments against the application of strict
scrutiny to the case, or even against any judicial interference at all.156
In conclusion, the analysis of several first-order cases shows that the Court,
because of the balancing consciousness and the rights rhetoric, applied a rightsoriented balancing to them that in fact confused them with second-order cases.
The next section discusses the opposite problem caused by the balancing
consciousness: the tendency of the balancing consciousness to level the conflict
even when it should properly be treated as a conflict between a higher-level right
and a lower-level interest.

B. Confusing Second-Order with First-Order Rights claims (The Second-to-First
Order Mix-Up).
The second confusion caused by the balancing consciousness and the rightsrhetoric is just as problematic as the first—arguably even more so. It results when
first-order analysis and balancing are applied to second-order/exclusionary rights.
While the first problem was elevating a first-order interest to the status of a
second-order right, this problem consists of lowering a second-order right to the
level of a first-order interest (the second-to-first order mix-up). Here lies the
danger of diluting an exclusionary right, and finding it easier to uphold
illegitimate governmental considerations by balancing them rather than excluding
them. In addition, the Court might understate the justification for judicial review
since it would view the conflict as a policy conflict and not as an exclusionary
conflict. An analysis of the three areas of constitutional law, as they relate to this

156

Compare Rubenfeld, supra note 108 (arguing against subjecting affirmative action plans to

strict scrutiny).
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set of problems, follows. The discussions of free speech and equal protection are
divided into two sections: confusions in rhetoric and confusions in the result.
1. Free Speech
1. Consider one of the infamous cases of the McCarthy era, Dennis v. United
States,157 which involved a conspiracy conviction against the leaders of the
American Communist Party. This case, like other McCarthy era cases, was
identified in Part III as a second-order case of direct infringement of speech.158
Part III argued that the McCarthy era cases involved governmental attempts to
suppress a certain political point of view, namely communism.159 As such, they
involved a conflict between a second-order free speech claim to completely
exclude governmental intervention in the free market of ideas, and a
governmental first-order interest in such intervention.
However, Justice Frankfurter concurring in the case, portrayed the conflict in
different terms:
Our judgment is thus solicited on a conflict of interests of the utmost concern to
the well-being of the country [free speech and national security]. This conflict of
interests cannot be resolved by a dogmatic preference for one or the other, nor by
a sonorous formula which is in fact only a euphemistic disguise for an unresolved
conflict. If adjudication is to be a rational process, we cannot escape a candid
examination of the conflicting claims with full recognition that both are supported
by weighty title-deeds.160

This passage shows that Frankfurter portrayed the conflict in the Dennis case
as a typical first-order conflict between two same-level interests, rather than, as a
second-order conflict between claims of two different levels. Both free speech and
national security were portrayed as legitimate interests “supported by weighty

157

341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951).

158

See cases cited in note 81 supra.

159

See supra note 81and accompanying text.

160

Id. at 519.
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title-deeds,” with no “dogmatic preference for one or the other.” Balancing was
therefore, according to Frankfurter, the only rational choice.161 Such
characterization of the conflict mischaracterized the conflict and lowered the
claimant’s free speech claim in the case into a mere policy claim. Once the free
speech is lowered to the level of a policy claim, it becomes much easier to arrive
at the final problematic outcome of the case—upholding the conviction of the
communist party leaders162
Confusing the case with a first-order free speech case further misrepresented
the issue of the cost of allowing more speech and the non-absolute nature of free
speech. In Dennis these costs were presumably the dangers ensuing from the
communist message. Balancing was therefore argued to be inevitable unless free
speech were to become an absolute value163 giving people “unlimited license to
talk.” 164
However, this argument too confuses between a first-order and a second-order
claim. As the discussion in Part II and III showed the anti-absolutist argument is
appropriate only with regard to first-order claims, not second-order claims.
Second-order claims are not reliant on resources and costs, but rather express an

161

See Id.; "The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in

national security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests,
within the confines of the judicial process." Id. at 525.
162

It further diverted any attempt to portray the governmental motive as an illegitimate motive

of suppressing speech, since, by definition, a balancing/ first-order solution implied that both
interests in the conflict were legitimate.
163

"Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions... The demands of free speech

in a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and
informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by
announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non- Euclidian problems to be solved." Id. at 525.
164

Quoting Justice Harlan in another case of the McCarthy era, Konigsberg v. State Bar 366

U.S. 36 (1961) “Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized [that] constitutionally
protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. [When] constitutional
protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be
affected and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved.”
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earlier decision on costs.165 The second-order free speech norm in particular
expresses an earlier decision to disregard some of speech’s costs, i.e. those costs
ensuing from allowing a free market of ideas. The argument that free speech has
costs and has to be balanced, therefore, diverts attention from the claim that an
earlier decision on costs has already been made by the free speech norm itself.
Justice Black, dissenting in Dennis, makes a similar point:
Undoubtedly, a governmental policy of unfettered communication of ideas does
entail dangers. To the Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived
from free expression were worth the risk. They embodied this philosophy in the
First Amendment's command that “Congress shall make no law… abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press…”166

Dennis is therefore a case in which the balancing consciousness confuses a
second-order right claim with a first-order interest claim. The second-order right
claim is stripped of its special status as an exclusionary claim, because it is
confused with cases in which it is only a first-order policy claim for resources.
This second-to-first order mix-up is a mirror of the first-to-second order mix-up
that was discussed earlier. In the former mix-up, the coupling of rights rhetoric
with balancing caused a first-order claim to be given an inappropriate “dogmatic”
preference

167

over a conflicting first-order claim. Here, the coupling of a

balancing rhetoric with rights caused a second-order claim to be inappropriately
reduced to the level of the conflicting claim, instead of being appropriately
separated from it as a higher-level claim.
The historical explanation given earlier seems to give a good account of why
this happened. Frankfurter was a latter day progressive who believed in the
progressive legacy of rejecting absolutes and using balancing.

However,

Frankfurter applied anti-absolutism and balancing even when the conflict was no
longer a conflict over economic laissez faire, as in the Lochner era, but a conflict
over political speech suppression as in the Dennis case. The result was that his
165

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

166

Id. at 580.

167

Compare with Frankfurter's words quoted supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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anti- absolutism and balancing were misapplied to a second-order conflict, and the
second type of mix-up was generated.168
Finally the second-to-first order mix-up also has implications in terms of
justifications for judicial review. The mischaracterization of the case as a firstorder case understates the justifications for judicial review in the case and makes
judicial restraint easier in the face of quite obvious attempts at suppression of
political speech. On the other hand, the uncovering of the true nature of the case
as a second-order case of illegitimate governmental motive would lead one to the
opposite conclusion. According to this analysis the Court must interfere and
abolish illegitimate suppression of ideas if it is to be loyal to the secondorder/exclusionary command of free speech. It cannot withhold its review in cases
of claims of reasonable governmental balance, since the question is not a question
of balancing at all, but of exclusion.169
2. Other free speech cases also involve the second-to-first order mix-up, but
only in rhetoric, not in the result. This mix-up in rhetoric rather than in the result
has a host of problems of its own. A good example is a case involving free speech
in education. In Board of Education v. Pico,170 a school board decided to remove
nine books from the school library because of their “anti-American, anti-Christian
[and] anti-Semitic” content.171 The school board’s removal of the books was quite
obviously based on objections to the message in the books, and therefore
appeared to involve an illegitimate message-based interference in the market of
ideas. The Court therefore appropriately held that, under certain circumstances,
such removal would violate the First Amendment.172 However, instead of
168

See the historical discussion in Part IV.B.

169

This is therefore Justice Black’s conclusion in Dennis: “So long as this Court exercises the

power of judicial review of legislation, I cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to
sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of Congress' or our own notions
of mere 'reasonableness.'” Id. at 580.
170

457 U.S. 853 (1981).
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457 U.S., at 857 (quoting the reasoning of the school board’s decision).

172

The Court remanded the case for further fact finding regarding the exact bases for the

decision to remove the books. Id., at 883 (plurality opinion of Justice Brennan.)
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reasoning its decision by arguing that free speech made the school board’s
message-based censorship illegitimate and excluded, the Court argued that a
balance had to be struck between free speech and the school board’s interest. The
children of the school, the Court argued, had a free speech interest to receive
information and this interest had to be balanced with the school board’s interest to
inculcate community values to the children of the community. In this balancing
act, the Court maintained, the free speech interest outbalanced and overrode the
community interest.
Such balancing-oriented portrayal of the case misrepresented the real conflict
in the case, and made it easier to criticize the judicial opinion. Why is it, one may
ask, that the interest in inculcating community values was overridden by the
children’s interest in receiving information? How did the Court weigh the
competing interests in order to arrive at this conclusion? Balancing gives a poor
explanation the Court’s decision. This is so, since the decision was actually based
on an exclusionary logic, and not on balancing. According to this logic, the school
board’s interest was not overridden by speech, but was simply made irrelevant by
speech. Free speech means that one cannot suppress certain ideas only because
they contradict community values. Indeed, ideas that need protection most are
those that contradict community values the most. Some damage to the inculcation
of community values is therefore a cost, which is disregarded by an earlier
decision on costs, expressed by the second-order free speech norm of the free
market of ideas. As such it should not be balanced with free speech at all.
Although the case ended in a decision in favor of free speech, and therefore
included only a mix-up in rhetoric, not in the result, its implications are not only
rhetorical. For the outcome of the reasoning in rhetorical confusion cases, such as
Pico, is a dilution of the analytical strength of the rights claim. Such dilution
might invite real future infringements of the second-order right, as in the case of
Dennis.
2. Dormant Commerce Clause
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How does the second-to-first order mix-up present itself in the area of
commerce clause jurisprudence? In this area, a second-to-first order mix-up
would mean balancing a totally illegitimate protectionist motive, instead of
absolutely excluding it. This could lead the Court to uphold regulations despite an
illegitimate protectionist motive (confusion in result) or it could lead the Court to
repeal the regulation, but justify it, inappropriately, in balancing terms instead of
in exclusionary terms (confusion in rhetoric).
In the Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, discussed in
Part III,173 the Court was guilty of confusion in rhetoric. As argued earlier, a close
reading of the case shows that the Court identified an illegitimate protectionist
motive to prevent out-of-state competition. It therefore appropriately repealed the
regulation. But instead of reasoning this repeal by saying that the commerce
clause (second-order) interest completely excluded an illegitimate protectionist
interest, the Court inappropriately reasoned it through balancing. It said that the
interest in free interstate commerce overrode the legitimate interest of the state in
regulating commerce.174
This confusion led to the same problems that were identified in free speech
rhetorical confusion cases. The decision was poorly reasoned and its true nature
distorted.175 As in the area of free speech, this confusion was due to the balancing
consciousness.

The

progressive

influenced

tendency of

the

balancing

consciousness to view every decision as a policy conflict between two legitimate
interests, has blurred the distinction between the two types of commerce clause
claims and flattened anti-protectionist claims into being only first-order claims for
more free interstate commerce.
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432 U.S. 333 (1977). See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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“We are confronted with the task of effecting an accommodation of the competing national

and local interests.” (Justice Burger, writing for the Court). Justice Burger consequently found that
the national interest overrode the local interest. Id., at 350.
175

See Regan, supra note 97, at 1208 referring to the Hunt case: “the balancing language is

only a veneer which has virtually nothing to do with the Court's effective decision process as
revealed in the parts of the opinions where the cases are actually disposed of.”
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3. Equal Protection
Finally, in the area of equal protection and the right to equality, confusion
between first-order and second-order claims would mean treating the secondorder equal protection norm (the norm against simple-discrimination) as if it were
only a first-order equal protection interest (the interest in furthering more equality
or integration). Such confusion would dilute the strength of the second-order
equal protection principle and mischaracterize it as if it were merely a policy
claim that had to be balanced with other claims.
1. Let us look first at an example of confusion in rhetoric only. In Part III, the
case that was discussed as the typical second-order equal protection case was
Brown v. Board of Education. However, even in Brown there seems to be a
confusion of the equal protection second-order claim—the claim to completely
abolish discrimination based on race animus—with the equal protection firstorder claim—the claim to further the integration of blacks into society. This
confusion is evident in the passages of the opinion that refer to the psychological
effects of desegregation on the self-image of black students and in the famous
footnote 11.176 Such passages may suggest that the Court viewed the case as a
policy case, in which the costs of desegregation (such as the psychological effects
of school segregation on black students) were balanced with the costs of
integration and found to outbalance them. However, this first-order/balancing
portrayal of the reasoning in Brown seems to mischaracterize the equal protection
claim in Brown, and also the Court’s own thought process. This is so, since it is
quite evident that the Court could have found no empirical argument or policy
argument to justify southern segregation in public schools. The actual idea behind

176

See Brown 691-2: “To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely

because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone… this finding is amply supported
by modern [psychological] authority” The Court then cites several psychological studies to show
psychological damage from desegregation, in the famous footnote 11, of the case.
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the case (and the way it is publicly perceived) is that segregation amounted to
discrimination and was therefore totally invalid and excluded.177
As in the areas of free speech and commerce clause, this confusion is due to
the balancing consciousness. The balancing consciousness does not distinguish
between the two types of equal protection claims, and subsequently lowers the
second-order simple discrimination claim in Brown into a first-order claim for
accommodation. Here too, this tendency of the Court can be explained by a
progressive heritage. The progressive heritage of pragmatism and instrumentalism
encouraged empirical, policy-oriented examination of every judicial problem.178
However, even though this tendency was appropriate to first-order cases such as
those involved in the Lochner era, it was inappropriate to second-order cases,
such as Brown.
2. In Brown the second-to-first order mix-up was a mix-up in the rhetoric
only, since the Court actually repealed the discriminatory regulation. Are there
cases of equal protection, second-to-first order mix-ups in the result also? A
recent equal protection case, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,179 may represent
such a mix-up. The balancing rhetoric in that case allowed the Court to actually
uphold and legitimize simple discrimination against homosexuals.
The Boy Scouts case involved a dismissal of an assistant scoutmaster due only
to the fact that he was a homosexual. On its face, this appears to be a classic case
of simple discrimination. The assistant scoutmaster was dismissed because of
homophobic sentiments, which should have been totally excluded as illegitimate
because of the second-order equal protection norm against simple discrimination.
However, the Court, aided by the balancing consciousness, interpreted the case
177

See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 998 arguing that Brown was based on the rejection of

discrimination and not on balancing: “Of course… there were competing interests at stake. But the
Court based its decision--as has society--not on the balance of those interests, but on the
intolerability of racial discrimination.”
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See Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90

CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005) (arguing that Brown—specifically footnote 11— contributed to law's
increasingly multidisciplinary and empirical character).
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120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
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differently. By applying balancing, the Court channeled the decision into the
terms of two competing legitimate interests. The Court found such legitimate
interest on the side of the Boy Scouts in their interest to “expressive association.”
The Court held that “the forced inclusion of [the homosexual scoutmaster] would
significantly affect [the Boy Scouts'] expression,”180 and maintained that a balance
should be struck between the “associational interest in freedom of expression…
on one side of the scale, and the State's interest on the other.”181 Finally the Court
found that the expressional interest overrode the State’s interest, and ruled in
favor of the Boy Scouts.
In terms of the dual model, this case represents the problematic lowering of a
second-order claim to the level of a first-order claim. The claimant’s second-order
equal protection claim was lowered to the level of a first-order claim. Instead of
excluding the Boys Scouts’ interest altogether because of the equal protection
norm, the Court balanced it with the equal protection norm, and finally found that
it overrode that norm.
The Boy Scouts case is a good example of the problems of modern balancing
for another reason as well. This case is not only a striking case of lowering the
claimant’s second-order claim to a first-order claim, it is also a case of elevating
the respondent’s first-order claim—the Boys Scouts’ free speech claim—to the
level of a second-order claim. It thus represents both problems of modern
balancing, and is an appropriate case to conclude this discussion with.
Consider the Boy Scouts’ free speech claim. Their claim was not a claim to
abolish illegitimate message-based discrimination against their speech. This is so,
since anti-discrimination regulations, such as the New Jersey law that banned the
Boy Scouts’ discrimination, were not motivated by any cognizable animus
towards the Boy Scouts’ message. The Boys Scouts could have advocated
homophobic messages as much as they wanted. The only thing that these
regulations banned was actual discrimination against homosexuals. In terms of the
analysis in Part III, this means that the anti-discrimination laws affected the Boy
180
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Scouts’ speech only indirectly (by limiting their ability to express themselves
through discrimination) or, alternatively, that the Boy Scouts’ claim was a claim
that society accommodate their expressive conduct by excusing them of the antidiscrimination principle.182 The Boy Scouts could therefore show, at most, only a
first-order free speech interest, to be excused from anti-discrimination regulation.
As such their first-order interest should have been properly excluded by the
second-order equal protection norm against simple discrimination. Instead it was
elevated to the level of a second-order free speech claim, and subsequently it
outbalanced the equal protection norm.

VI. CONCLUSION
The dual model argues for an important distinction between two types of
constitutional claims and two types of constitutional conflicts—first-order and
second-order claims and conflicts. It further argues that the idea that every
constitutional conflict is about balancing—the balancing consciousness—fails to
distinguish between these two types of claims and conflicts, and consequently
distorts their nature.
The first implication of this analysis is that balancing in secondorder/exclusionary conflicts, when the constitutional right is properly interpreted
as a second-order consideration, which totally excludes the governmental
consideration, is inappropriate. If one agrees that certain rights should be properly
interpreted as totally excluding certain governmental interests, one must deny the
possibility that the judicial task in protecting these rights is a task of balancing.
Indeed the main fault of balancing in such cases is in distorting the nature of these
conflicts. The balancing consciousness portrays such conflicts as conflicts
between two legitimate interests, in which the problem is a problem of
proportionality, while in effect the problem in such cases is the problem of the
legitimacy of one of the interests—the governmental interest. Instead of
182

Compare with the analysis of the Schneider case, according to which, the claimant’s in

Schneider, asked that their speech be accommodated by excusing them from anti-litter regulations.
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concentrating on determining the conditions under which the governmental
interest is legitimate, the balancing consciousness therefore pushes the decisionmaker straight to the second stage of checking the governmental interest’s
proportionality, diverting attention from the question of legitimacy. Historical
examples, such as the Court’s record in protecting free speech during the
McCarthy era, point at the dangers of this distortion. Current conflicts between
national security and individual rights, may arguably present similar dangers.
The second implication of this analysis concerns first-order conflicts. Here,
the identification of the case as a first-order conflict may not be conclusive
regarding the question of balancing. One may hold, as the progressives did, that
once the conflict is identified as a first-order conflict its solution is properly left to
the legislature, and hence, that there should be no judicial balancing in
constitutional law. That is, although the conflict is indeed a balancing conflict, it
does not call for judicial balancing, but rather for legislative balancing. One may,
however, hold a different view on this matter and still be loyal to the dual model.
One may hold, for example, that the fact that a conflict is a first-order, policy
conflict or a budgetary conflict does not make the Court’s balancing in the case
inappropriate. Or, one may hold, that the Court’s balancing is appropriate only is
some first-order conflicts and not in others. These determinations will depend on
jurisprudential views regarding the proper role of the Court in the democratic
framework, which are not discussed by the dual model. The dual model, however,
clarifies the terms under which such determinations ought to be made.

